The Half-Hearted Compromise within Indonesian Politics: The Dynamics of Political Coalition among Islamic Political Parties (1999-2019)

Abdul Chalik
UIN Sunan Ampel Surabaya, Indonesia
Email: a.chalik@uinsby.ac.id

Abstract: Political coalition is an everyday business in modern democracy. In Indonesia, coalition happens especially for presidential election, gubernatorial and district head election. The trends also found among Islamic parties. Over time, political dynamics shift does reflect changes happened within broader societal discourse and in turn influence the distribution of Indonesia's voter base among different political parties. The dynamic is proven to have encouraged the pragmatic formation of coalitions between ideologically-different political parties. The paper analyzes the dynamic of political coalition among Islamic parties in 1999-2019. There are three arguments underlying Islamic parties' coalition: ideological similarity, political pragmatism, and compromise through ideological similarity and political pragmatism. Ideological coalition is formed with, the similarities between party platforms. Meanwhile, the coalition formed with political pragmatism is mostly to gain political position and advantages. Admittedly, There are also coalitions formed due to combinations of both factors.
Keywords: Islamic parties, Ideology, political pragmatism.

Introduction

The coalition of Islamic parties that has taken place so far has shown an interesting dynamic. One important note is that no single Islamic party has consistently maintained its principle to stay in the same coalition for general elections. There are several reasons behind that trend, among them is the small number of votes they obtained in elections. Another factor is the fact that, despite the similarity shared by the Islamic parties, it is still difficult for them to bridge the

differences between the party's platforms.[1] To give illustration, the coalition in the 2019 Presidential election that put Joko Widodo versus Prabowo Subianto in the rematch—as in the 2014 election—was heavily loaded with ideological issues echoed by supporting political parties and here especially by the Islamic parties. Joko Widodo and Ma'ruf Amin were supported by the Koalisi Merah Putih (KMP/The Red and White Coalition) which consists of PDIP, PKB, Golkar, PPP, Nasdem, Hanura, and PKPI. Meanwhile, Prabowo Subianto and Sandiaga Uno were supported by the Koalisi Indonesia Hebat (KIH/Great Indonesia Coalition) which consists of Gerindra, PKS, PAN, and Demokrat Party in. Nonetheless, after the election, these issues become loose[2] or they arbitrarily disappear[3]. PAN changed its side and become more adjacent to the power-holder to be part of the government.

The Islamic parties that became the main actors of that coalition since then were PPP *(The United Development Party),* PKB *(The National Awakening Party),* PAN *(The National Mandate Party)*, and PKS *(The Prosperous Justice Party).* These four parties exist up to now. Another party that worth's mentioning is PBB (Star and Crescent Party). Although it is a non-parliamentary party, it has a long and glorious history as the re-embodiment of Masjumi was one of the largest Islamic parties in Indonesia Islamic parties refer to political parties which hold Islam at the center of their political ideologies and rely upon Muslims' support.[4] Islamic parties fall into two categories, ideology and supporter base. Ideologically, there are two patterns of Islamic parties, nationalist Islam and trans-nationalist Islam. Further categorization shows that the nationalist Islamic parties take two forms, moderate and conservative. In this regards, PAN and PKB can be said as moderate Islamic parties while PPP and PBB are the conservative ones. In fact, there are various terms used by scholar's in reference to PKN and PAN. Pepinsky et al. use the term "Islamic

---

[1] Andreas Ufen, "From *Aliran* to Dealignment: Political Parties in Post-Suharto Indonesia," *South East Asia Research* 16, 1 (2008), p. 39.

[2] Diego Fossati, "The Resurgence of Ideology in Indonesia: Political Islam, *Aliran* and Political Behaviour," *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 38, 2 (2019), pp. 119–148.

[3] Thomas S. Power, "Jokowi's Authoritarian Turn and Indonesia's Democratic Decline," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 54, 3 (2018), pp. 326-328.

[4] Thomas Pepinsky, R William Liddle, and Saiful Mujani, "Indonesian Democracy and the Transformation of Political Islam," https://courses.cit.cornell.edu/tp253/docs/-transformation.pdf accessed on 19 January 2019.

parties" while Baswedan uses the term "Islam-inclusive" parties.[5] In addition, Saleem uses the term 'culturally influenced Islamic party'.[6] The view behind the naming is based on how both parties are being understood as embracing the inclusive ideologies, accommodating a diversity of supporters, and practices Islam substantively.[7] On the other hand, Pepinsky et al. use the term "Islamist parties" to describe PPP, PKS, and PBB[8], while Baswedan use the term "Islam-exclusive" for them.[9] This view is based on the use of religion and its symbol in campaigning political aspirations, besides applying Islam as the core ideology implicitly and explicitly on party platform. Meanwhile, PKS is categorized as a transnational Islamic party because it is based on the transnational ideas. Most of its founders and figures were educated in the Middle East. In addition, its Islamic political outlook intersects with al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun of Egypt and Jama'at Islami of Pakistan.[10]

Previous researches explained that the presence of the decay of coalition involving Islamic parties is due to the fact that the ideological commitments is no longer the main consideration. As shown in the research of Lay,[11] Noor,[12] Romli,[13] Hamayotsu,[14] Ufen,[15] and Fossati,[16] ideology is not the main identity Islamic parties offer to their

---

[5] Anies Rasyid Baswedan, "Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future Trajectory," *Asian Survey* 44, 5 (2004), pp. 669–690.

[6] Raja M. Ali Saleem, "Identifying Islamist Parties Using Gunther and Diamond's Typology," *SAGE Open* 4, 3 (2014), p. 6.

[7] Mark Woodward, "Indonesia's Religious Political Parties: Democratic Consolidation and Security in Post-New Order Indonesia," *Asian Security* 4, 1 (2008), pp. 49–55.

[8] Pepinsky, "Indonesian Democracy and the Transformation of Political Islam.

[9] Baswedan,"Political Islam in Indonesia, p. 681.

[10] M. Imdatun Rahmat, *Arus Baru Islam Radikal Transmisi Revivalisme Islam Timur Tengah Ke Indonesia* (Jakarta: Penerbit Erlangga, 2006), p. 120.

[11] Cornelis Lay, "Democratic Transition in Local Indonesia: An Overview of Ten Years Democracy," *Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik* 15, 3 (2012), p. 224.

[12] Firman Noor, "Prilaku politik pragmatis dalam kehidupan politik kontemporer; kajian atas menyurutnya peran ideologi politik di era reformasi," *Masyarakat Indonesia* 40, 1 (2014), p. 57.

[13] Lili Romli, "Crescent and Electoral Strength: Islamic Party Portrait of Reform Era In Indonesia," *International Journal of Islamic Thought* 4 (2013), p. 38.

[14] Kikue Hamayotsu, "The End of Political Islam? A Comparative Analysis of Religious Parties in the Muslim Democracy of Indonesia," *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 30, 3 (2011), p. 136.

[15] Ufen, "From *Aliran* to Dealignment, pp. 4-41.

[16] Fossati, "The Resurgence of Ideology in Indonesia, p. 119–148.

constituents, for not to say that ideology is abandoned altogether. In line with that, Bourchier, for example,[17] suggests that it is too early to state that ideological issues in parties—especially in Islamic parties, have died. Parties seem to keep maintaining it in order to strengthen the network with the constituents.

Yet, the Islamic political parties do not give emphasize in regards to the ideological issue in forming the coalitions. Parties also realize that religious issues do not positively correlate with the vote share in elections. Moreover, the practice of coalitions no longer considers the ideological background of parties as the basis for coalition formation. Rather, it is the number of votes expected and predicted to be gained in supporting the coalition in the government that becomes the main consideration. Unsurprisingly, in order to form a coalition, parties take the pragmatic choice and even compromise and this means forming a coalition even though the platform and the parties' ideals are different from other members of coalition and even its direction. Nevertheless, the coalition that is based on compromise seem to be fragile and it likely crumbles along the way due to steep difference of interests. This practice is what is called the 'half-hearted coalition'.

This article discusses the dynamics of the political coalition of Islamic parties in Indonesia from 1999 to 2019 with aim to explore the formation of the half-hearted compromise coalition and the implications for the next coalition. The analysis describes the coalition models, namely the ideological similarity, political pragmatism, and compromise, as well as the parties that are predicted to be consistent and change.

Considerations of Coalition among Islamic Parties

A political party could not independently run over time. It requires other political supports since the electoral votes are limited.[18] Coope-ration among political parties in Indonesia is called coalition. It refers to joint efforts integrating interests to achieve common purposes.[19] It

---

[17] David M. Bourchier, "Two Decades of Ideological Contestation in Indonesia: From Democratic Cosmopolitanism to Religious Nationalism," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* (2019), p. 13.

[18] Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda, "An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 6, 3 (1994), p. 262.

[19] Oscar Fitch-Roy, Jenny Fairbrass, and David Benson, "Ideas, Coalitions and Compromise: Reinterpreting EU-ETS Lobbying through Discursive Institutionalism," *Journal of European Public Policy* 27, 1 (2020), p. 93.

is collection of government parties,[20] as well as joint movement that share benefits by adhering to stipulated coalition agreement, both at legislative and executive level.

A theoretical perspective that has been referred by many researchers and employed in many countries is Riker's Coalition theory. In his book, *Theory of Political Coalition*,[21] he postulated that coalition occurred for two reasons, office and policy seeking. Office seeking assumes that party is perceived as a single entity that focuses on bargaining and power-seeking. The main consideration is number of seats as bargaining power in coalition. Meanwhile, the ideological coalition is based on perspectives in assessing policy. Party will force coalition with others that possess ideological proximity. Dorey and Garrett explain that ideological coalition is more like "marriage of like minds", not "marriage of inconvenience"[22]. This, then, will generate high possibility that proposed policy plan is in line with coalition member's preference. Although eventually Riker's view was criticized by several researchers, the concept of "office seeking" has buried other assumption over coalition. The assumption is that the goal of party is to fight for ideology as well as to gain position. Austen and Smith offer "compromise" coalition[23] of political parties. Political compromise is one of the "middle way" in democracy when all parties hold no common ground.[24] The basic idea of compromise is to avoid any contention between political parties and office. In presidential system, compromise is a political way for multi-ethnic community, like Indonesia, aimed at maintaining unity.[25] In short, compromise is, undeniably, part of coalition practices.

---

[20] Alfonso Casani, "Cross-Ideological Coalitions under Authoritarian Regimes: Islamist-Left Collaboration among Morocco's Excluded Opposition," *Democratization* 27, 7 (2020), pp. 1183–1201.

[21] William H Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven/New York: Yale University Press, 1962).

[22] Peter Dorey and Mark Garnett, *The Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Gavernment 2010-2015* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), p. 298.

[23] Itai Sened, "A Model of Coalition Formation: Theory and Evidence," *The Journal of Politics* 58, 2 (1996), p. 360.

[24] James David Hodgson, "The Role of Parties in Democracy: Coalitions and an Ethic of Compromise," *Representation* 57, 3 (2021), pp. 9–10.

[25] Timo Duile and Jonas Bens, "Indonesia and the 'Conflictual Consensus': A Discursive Perspective on Indonesian Democracy," *Critical Asian Studies* 49, 2 (2017), p. 19.

During the *Reformasi* era, which is marked by reasonably free elections and normal democratic processes, numerous political parties emerged and therefore coalition became an inevitable consequence. The election result in *Reformasi* era shows that no political parties gained dominant votes. In such situation, coalition is inevitable. In this regards, even though nationalist parties are dominant, Islamic parties still hold values and become the game-changer as counterweight parties.

In the 1955 election, the cumulative votes for Islamic parties were 43%. In the New Order era, the accumulation of votes of Islamic parties were about 27% in 1971 election. However, after a forced fusion of Islamic parties into PPP, the votes in the following elections fluctuated to around 15 %. Within the Reformasi era, the votes of Islamic party increased but not significantly. In the broad sense, the votes of five national Islamic parties were still under the nationalists. The accumulation of votes was 37.59% in the 1999 election, and 38.54% in 2004, 25.94% in 2009, 31.39% in 2014,[26] and 30,05% in 2019.[27] The numbers include votes accumulated by those parties that failed to pass the parliamentary threshold but still contributed quite a significant number of votes.

Out of five Islamic parties that stayed in parliament, several of them has differences in ideologies and agendas. This certainly influences the ways in which parties consider the form of coalition. To give illustration, PKS and PBB that have closed ideology are less likely to collaborate with PKB that contributes a considerable number of votes from Islamic parties. Here, PKB actually is more likely to work with PPP due to the fact that they share Nahdlatul Ulama members as supporter. Meanwhile, coalition with PAN seems quite likely to occur although there is primordial tension between modernist Muhammadiyah and traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama.

Based on the above points, there seem to be three main reasons why Islamic parties call for coalition: first is the ideological similarity, second is the pragmatism which means coalition forming for the sake

---

[26] Moch Nurhasim, *Masa Depan Partai Islam Di Indonesia Studi Tentang Volatilitas Elektroral Dan Faktor-Faktor Penyebabnya* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar and LIPI, 2016), p. 233.

[27] Komisi Pemilihan Umum, "Hasil Hitung Suara Legislatif DPR RI 2019," https://pemilu2019.kpu.go.id/#/dprri/hitung-suara/ accessed on 22 January 2021.

of staying relevant in the parliament, and third is the combinations of both.

Ideological Principles of Coalition

The coalition of Islamic parties took place in the 1999 election, the first election after *Reformasi*. 48 political parties took part in the election. After the election, a tendency toward ideological coalition emerged when Islamic parties formed the so called "Poros Tengah" (the central axis) coalition. The coalition according to many, is aimed at resisting the PDIP, which was considered a secular party, and Golkar, which was considered as loyalist of New Order regime.[28] The central axis was very strategic since it was backed by Muslim figures and chairmen of political parties. They were Amien Rais of PAN, Gus Dur of PKB, Yusril Ihza Mahendra of PBB and Nur Mahmudi Ismail of Partai Keadilan.[29] In addition, there was also PPP that has existed since 1973. In fact, the coalition had successfully managed to deliver Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) the presidency.

Nevertheless, the Central axis could not be separated from the political complexity before and after the election held on 7th of June 1999. Although initially Gus Dur was reluctant towards the idea of Islamic parties' coalition partly due to his cordial relationship with Megawati, at the end he joined the "the central axis" as proposed by Amien Rais. Islamic parties run consolidation and release "Komunike I and II" about incongruent of motives to save the elections as well as prevent the New Order regime from regaining the power. The communiqué was signed by several national figures, including Gus Dur as the chairman of PBNU, Amien Rais as the leader of Muhammadiyah and Megawati as the chairman of PDIP.[30] In the meantime, political constellation at that time was divided into two groups: pro-*Reformasi* and status quo.

Before and after the presidential election, the romantism of Islamic parties put aside several differences including the frictions and tensions between NU-Muhammadiyah, the historical differences between Amien Rais-Gus Dur or even in general between traditionalist-modernist that resembles 'fire in the husk'. To give illustration, Amien Rais and Gus Dur even attended NU-Muhammadiyah recitation event,

---

[28] Noor, "Prilaku politik pragmatis, p. 60.

[29] Zainal Abidin Amir, *Peta Islam Politik Pasca-Soeharto* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2003), pp. 25-58

[30] "Hadang Status Quo," Kompas, 18 May 1999.

on 26 September 1999 at Muhammadiyah head office which signified the convergence of NU-Muhammadiyah. [31] This also marks that communication and relationship continued among Islamic party elites. However, a critical question proposed by some scholars[32] is regarding how long would the marriage of substantialist Islamic and formalist Islamic parties able to survive and how long would both groups able to sit at one table and restrain not to abuse each other? In understanding this, one must learn from history that parties that were founded after Reformasi have intersection in ideology and supporters with 1955 election parties. Baswedan called it as 'transformation',[33] while others mentioned it as 'continuity'. [34] NU transformed into PKB, Masyumi transformed into PPP, PBB even PAN.[35] NU and Masyumi used to be big Islamic parties with each gained 18,4 % and 20,9% in 1955 election respectively.

As the winning party, PDIP intended to endorse Megawati as the candidate for presidency. However, this leads to concerns particularly from Muslim communities. The more conservative Muslims went further and persistently rejected the idea of a woman as president.[36] The situation drew for alternatives of new political power in order to go against it. Golkar, that can be considered as the common enemy at the time, pushed the idea of BJ Habibie for presidency. Unsatisfied with neither Megawati nor Habibie, several leaders of Islamic parties, including Amien Rais, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, Hamzah Haz and Yusuf Hasyim[37] initiated the third faction called Poros Tengah (Central Axis) and then asked Gus Dur to accept presidential nomination. After BJ Habibie withdrew his candidacy, Golkar opted to support Gus Dur as president. Thus, the coalition of Islamic parties was massively boosted by Golkar, which was a nationalist party. However, with Golkar on board, the coalition could no longer considered as coalition between Islamic parties. Despite that fact, history shows that the coalition was a

---

[31] Amir, *Peta Islam Politik Pasca-Soeharto*, p. 263

[32] Some Indonesianists, like Greg Barton and William Liddle, ridiculed this ideology-based coalition, see Ibid. p. 256.

[33] Baswedan, "Political Islam in Indonesia, p. 682.

[34] Pal Gyene, "Democracy, Islam and Party System in Indonesia: Towards a Consensus-Oriented Model", *PCD (Power Conflict Democracy) Journal* 7, 1 (2019), p. 43.

[35] Baswedan, "Political Islam in Indonesia, p. 680.

[36] "Tolakan dari kursi Islam," Tempo, 27 July 1999.

[37] "Pelumas peredaran darah," Gatra, 31 July 1999.

big success and one clear indicator is Gus Dur's victory over Megawati in the presidential race. The result in the MPR's general session on 20th of October 1999 was 373 votes for Gus Dur and 313 votes for.[38]

However, the coalition of Islamic parties (plus Golkar, the nationalist and loyalist of the New Order Regime) supporting Gus Dur did not last long. In addition to carrying historical loads, Islamic parties adhere to ideology and character attached to each party and hence it is difficult to put them together into a stable and lasting coalition. The main reason for this breakup was in-fighting within his government.[39] Many factions in the coalition started to oppose the president. It is safe to say that it is PAN that brought the initiative leading to the break up. They firstly revoked support for Gus Dur declared in its congress held in Yogyakarta, February 2001.[40] After that, they then accused Gus Dur being involved or correlated with corruption case called as Buloggate. The latest one then became the entrance to his impeachment in 23rd of July 2001. Amien Rais remained as intellectual actor who mobilized Islamic and nationalist parties in dismissing Gus Dur from the office, and then put Megawati from the PDIP as President with Hamzah Haz from PPP as Vice President. The era marked the end of an ideological coalition, and a shift towards a new chapter that can be defined as a more pragmatic coalition.

Political Pragmatism in Coalition

Ideological coalition of political parties no longer existed in the 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2019 elections. During the election, there were many indicators that show the phenomena of political pragmatism, identity crisis, and ideology confusion of political parties and here particularly the Islamic ones. Political pragmatism, according to Macridis, is when political parties focus only to win the election and share power.[41] Meanwhile, Imawan mentioned that ideology crisis and confusion in political parties are due to strong rational principles of a

---

[38] Angus McIntyre, "Megawati Sukarnoputri: From President's Daughter to Vice President," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 32, 1-2 (2000), p. 110.

[39] Edward Aspinall, "Democratization: Travails and achievements," Robert W. Hefner (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Indonesia* (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2018), p. 84.

[40] McIntyre, "Megawati Sukarnoputri: From President's, p. 104.

[41] Roy C. Macridis, "Sejarah, Fungsi dan Tipologi Partai-partai," Ichlasul Amal, *Teori-teori Mutakhir Partai Politik* (Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana, 1996), p. 23.

party. He argued that the more modern the society the more powerful they are in holding the tenets pragmatism.[42] Such attitude resulted in fundamental changes in the response towards plurality, inclusiveness, and non-sectarianism. In addition, this also has led to attempts aimed at withdrawing the ideology tension of "right wing" and "left wing".

After the1999 election, political alliance has become daily routine. During this era, Islamic parties carried out various agendas and sensitive issues to entice Muslims as well as to encourage Islamic parties to unite. However, they learned from the 1999 elections that to win presidency they should amass votes from many spectrums of population and this means that the coalition limited to that among Islamic parties would not deliver. Hence, the tendency was to seek mate from different ideological background that combines Islamic and nationalist. Moreover, after 1999, the presidential election is conducted in a direct election where Indonesian citizens, the eligible ones, the directly vote to choose the candidate of the president. It was no longer the election by members of MPR. Considering this change,, Islamic parties take necessary measures to match-make their candidate, be it for the president position or the vice-president, with candidate from their nationalist-party colleague running mate. For example, in the 2004 presidential election, PAN and PKS supported Amien Rais-Siswono YH (Islam-Nationalist) to be president-vice president candidate while PPP offered Hamzah Haz-Agum Gumelar (Islam-nationalist). In line with that, Golkar supported Wiranto-Salahudin Wahid (Nationalist-Islam), PDIP and PDS support Megawati-Hasyim Muzadi (Nationalist-Islam), while Demokrat, PBB and PKPI backed Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY)-Yusuf Kalla (nationalist-Islam). Out of those five, two pairs went to second round, SBY-Yusuf Kalla and Megawati-Hasyim Muzadi. In this round, Islamic parties remained divided, and the winner was SBY-Yusuf Kalla backed by Demokrat and two Islamic parties: they are PBB and PKS.

The presidential election in 2004 was another stake for elites and Islamic parties. Since president and vice president are voted through direct election, the role of MPR was decreasing as it no longer has the power of decision making. The psychological effects of general assembly generated political uproar effecting the communication among Islamic parties, notably PKB. On the other hand, peoples'

---

[42] Riswanda Imawan, *Partai Politik di Indonesia: Pergulatan Setengah Hati Mencari Jati Diri* (Yogyakarta: Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2004).

support towards Islamic parties has experienced a decline. The decline shows as PAN falls from 7,11% (1999 election) to 6,44% (2004), PKB falls from 12,6% (1999) to 10,57% (2004), PPP falls from 10,71% (1999) to 8,15% (2004). While PK that has transformed into PKS recorded a significant raise from 1,36% (1999) to 7,34% (2004).[43] In addition to the decreasing votes, there are serious nationalist candidates for presidency that have appeared, SBY and Megawati. All these seem to have cornered Muslim elites and Islamic parties. During this unfortunate situation, prominent figures and political elites within the Islamic parties seem to not have option but taking measures in securing their places within the government and here means the ministerial portfolios by supporting one of the two candidates.

Five years later, the 2009 election saw the lowest vote share among Islamic parties during the Reformasi era. Except PKS, all Islamic parties experienced decline and PBB did not secure any seat in parliament. Drastic decline was also faced by PKB and this was very likely due to conflict between Gus Dur and Muhaimin Iskandar. The decline was quite significant as the votes decreased from 10,57% to 4,94% which means that there was 5,63% decrease.[44] Several new parties that carried nationalist-religious ideologies, including Demokrat and Hanura performed reasonably well with 20,85% and 3,77% respectively.[45] This weakened the bargaining capital of Islamic parties. Out of the three president-vice president candidates, none of them represented Islamic party elites or figures who represented the interests of Islamic parties. Instead, Islamic parties played as subordinate forces under nationalists, notably Demokrat, PDIP, and Golkar.

In 2009 SBY unconventionally partnered with Boediono, an academic-cum-bureaucrat. All of the Islamic parties were in big coalition led by Demokrat. SBY-Boediono gained 60.80% votes, surpassed Megawati-Prabowo (PDIP-Gerindra) and Yusuf Kalla-Wiranto (Golkar-Hanura). Islamic parties tend to make coalition with established government-running parties. Admittedly, initiatives to bring Islamic parties together to run for presidential election had briefly

---

[43] Hamayotsu, "The end of political Islam, p. 137.

[44] Sri Yunanto and Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, "Fragmentations and Conflict among Islamic Political Parties in Indonesia during Reformasi Era (1998-2009): Anatomy, Factors and Implications," *Journal of Indonesia Islam* 7, 2 (2013), p. 310.

[45] Ibid.

emerged. Yet, there was no positive response especially from PKB.[46] All parties within the winning coalition were rewarded by minister seats, except PBB. The coalition in 2004 election to support SBY-Yusuf Kalla was primarily because of political considerations and power. Islamic parties were in the same line, yet it was not through a well-planned coalition. The fact that PKB, PAN, PKS, and PBB were in the same group is a quite clear indicator that the coalition is mostly, if note wholly, for political interest, not for ideological consideration.

Table 1. Coalition Map in 1999-2019 Election

President – Vice President	Support Coalition Before Election	Support Coalition After Election
Abdurahman Wahid-Megawati (1999-2001)	PAN, PKB, PPP, PBB, PK	PAN, PKB, PPP, PBB, PK, Golkar, PDIP, TNI/POLRI
Megawati-Hamzah Haz (2001-2004)	PDIP, PAN, PK, PPP, PBB, Golkar.	PDIP, PAN, PPP, PBB, Golkar, TNI/POLRI
Susilo Bambang Yudoyono-M. Jusuf Kalla (2004-2009)	PD, PBB, PKPI, PKS	PD, PBB, PKPI, PKS + PAN, PPP, PKB, Golkar
Susilo Bambang Yudoyono-Boediono (2009-2014)	PD, PAN, PKB, PPP, PKS	PD, PAN, PKB, PPP, PKS+ Golkar
Jokowi-M. Jusuf Kalla (2014-2019)	PDIP, PKB, Nasdem, Hanura	PDIP, PKB, Nasdem, Hanura + PAN, PPP, Golkar

Source: Election Commission (KPU), proceeded by the author

Islamic parties gained more votes in 2014 election compared to the 2009 election which means an improvement from 26% to 32%. The increase was due to several factors but mainly the party solidity and in this case is the PKB that has experienced a drastic drop. At the same time, another significant factor is the decrease of nationalist parties' votes caused by negative image towards corrupt behavior of party leaders. Despite the increase, there was no single figure that can unite

---

[46] "Hidayat wacanakan koalisi partai Islam di Pilpres 2009", https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2008/07/29/01035486/hidayat.wacanakan.koalisi.partai.islam.di.pilpres.2009 accessed on 28 June 2020.

Islamic parties to create Islamic bloc in national political stage. Elites of Islamic parties moved themselves in accordance with pragmatic ends at that time. Coalitions in 2014 were marked by the polarization of KMP and KIH. PAN, PPP, PKS and PBB, with total of 59.12% legislative seatsm join KIH to support Prabowo-Hatta Rajasa as presidential candidate. Meanwhile, PKB is in coalition with PDIP, Hanura, and Nasdem (40.88%) and support Joko Widodo-Yusuf Kalla. It turned out that Joko Widodo-Yusuf Kalla defeated Prabowo-Hatta. After election, PAN and PPP suddenly joined KIH and each of them was granted a minister portfolio. This move was quite sudden and seemed lack of strong arguments. The main reason was the breakup of KMP coalition.[47] It is important to not though that the transition of PAN chairman from Hatta Rajasa to Zulkifli Hasan[48] has had quite an impact on the pattern of PAN's political communication with the government. Moreover, Jokowi cemented his authority in a multi-party environment by using interventionist methods that lay outside the conventional tool box of coalitional presidentialism in democracies. To be sure, he applied traditional strategies[49] as well: cabinet authority, budgetary power, partisan power, legislative power and the exchange of favors. They were all present in his attempts to consolidate power during his turbulent first year.

The joining of Islamic parties into coalitions in 2004, 2009 and 2014 election was partly planned. The way coalition worked was after legislature election. Leading to presidential election, parties formed coalition. After the election, parties from the opposite side are likely to join the winning parties. "Midway coalition" is a term to express political practices done by Islamic parties at the time. It could not be denied that the pragmatic and opportunistic reasons are the main considerations lead the Islamic parties to join the government coalition. In a theoretical manner, pragmatic issue is related to material,

---

[47]"Ini penyebab PPP keluar dari koalisi Prabowo dan gabung ke Jokowi," https://-www.merdeka.com/politik/ini-penyebab-ppp-keluar-dari-koalisi-prabowo-gabung-ke-jokowi.html accessed on 8 July 2019

[48]"Pimpin PAN, janji kampanye Zulkifli langsung ditagih," https://nasional.tempo.-co/read/646431/pimpin-pan-janji-kampanye-zulkifli-hasan-langsung-ditagih accessed on 17 May 2019.

[49] Marcus Meitzner, "Coercing Loyalty: Coalitional Presidentialism and Party Politics in Jokowi's In Indonesia," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 38, 2 (2016), p. 229.

office, and self-interest.[50] Bettcher called it as "factions of interest"[51] over the pragmatic group. A political pragmatic situation was evident when the coalition hands or distributes the ministry seats and other strategic positions. The same kind of practices even lead to the cartel practices. Practice of cartel as described by Ambardi was also seen in the parliament.[52] The ideological solidity was set aside once they discussed crucial issues, such as local autonomy, BUMN (state-owned companies), national educational system, and labor. Parties tend to have agreement and left no ideological contention.[53]

The case of PPP and PAN in 2014 that changed side by joining Jokowi government shows the irrelevance of ideology among the Islamic parties.[54] There are no underlying arguments that caused them joined into coalition and the example here might be the shared motivation to support "pro-people" policies. In this regards, it is safe to say that political parties appear, or create their image as idealistic during the election when they try to gain public sympathy through the campaign and then, unfortunately, become pragmatic when they ruled. The tendency occurred to nationalist parties. This constrained Islamic parties from becoming major parties and even lose votes. There are reasons Islamic parties' votes are stagnant and even experience set back. In line with Carothers' view, Indonesian parties are "leader-centric,"[55] as they rely extensively on figures/elites. One of the parties centered on figures is PKB which, in this case, has been strongly influenced by Gus Dur. Even up to now with their role model has passed away, the figure is still used as a symbol and more particularly during the campaign.

The same phenomenon can be seen in PAN. The figure of Amien Rais as the mastermind of Reformasi remains to be exploited, and being used to appeal electorates. In relation to this, it is quite ironic

---

[50] Margit Tavist, "Principle vs Pragmatism: Policy Shift and Political Competition," *American Journal of Political Science* 51, 1 (2007), p. 153.

[51] Kim Eric Bettcher, "Factions of Interest in Japan and Italy: The Organizational and Motivational Dimensions of Factionalism," *Party Politics* 11, 3 (2005), p. 340.

[52] Ambardi, *The Making of Indonesian*, pp. 207-210.

[53] Sukri Tamma and Sakinah Nadir, "Koalisi Politik di Indonesia Pasca Soeharto," *Jurnal Review Politik* 3, 2 (2013), p. 275.

[54] Ibid. p. 209.

[55] Thomas Carothers, *Confronting the Weakest Link: Aiding Political Parties in The Democracies* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment in International Peace, 2006), p. 75.

that Mietzner views, political parties seem to have failed pursuing their goals and this include Islamic parties.[56] Parties that are supposed to be the main instrument in enforcing democracy, have in fact found themselves playing the opposing roles. As a consequence, public find it problematic and difficult in differentiating between that Islamic and the non-Islamic party except for its logo and campaign jargons. What happened here was the commodification of religion by the political party.[57] In the name of democracy, religion was traded and institutionalized by parties. Islamic parties find difficulties in delivering their clear concepts, ideas, and programs. Pepinsky states: "the Islamic piety does not always manifest itself in political parties that explicitly embrace Islam or push Islamic agenda forward".[58] In other words, Islamic parties do not always demonstrate Islamic manners in a clear and real context. Besides, internal conflicts become one of the main problems. PKB, PPP, and PKS [59] have experienced a prolonged conflict which resulted in their weak position within these coalitions. Furthermore, Islamic parties only play part as the subordinate within broader map of Indonesian politics. The positioning also are limited by labels that discourage Islamic political position[60] as "Islamic accommodation", "Islamic representation" or other labels to justify Islamic parties' bargaining power.

Compromise in Coalition

Compromise is the alternative reason that political parties call for coalition.[61] It is for idealism on the one side and for pragmatic need to stay in the office on the other side. Maintaining good relationship and

---

[56]Marcus Mietzner, *Money, Power, and Ideology: Political parties in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia* (Singapore: Southeast Asian Publications Series, NUS Press, 2013), p. 4.

[57] Purwo Santoso, "In The Name of Democracy; Commoditization of Religions by Political Parties in Indonesia," *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 4, 1 (2010), p. 106.

[58] Thomas B. Pepinsky, R. William Liddle, and Saiful Mujani, "Testing Islam's Political Advantage: Evidence from Indonesia," *American Journal of Political Science* 56 (2012), p. 591.

[59] Yunanto, Hamid, "Fragmentations and Conflict, p. 345.

[60] Mukrimin, "Islamic parties and politics of constitutionalism di Indonesia," *Journal of Indonesia Islam* 6, 2 (2012), p. 387.

[61] Oscar Fitch-Roy, Jenny Fairbrass, and David Benson, "Ideas, coalitions and compromise: reinterpreting EU-ETS lobbying through discursive institutionalism," *Journal of European Public Policy* 27 (2020), pp. 82-101.

avoid conflict is one of the keys to stay ruling.[62] This view reflects function of political parties as instrument of democracy, not only for office seeking.[63] Compromise is not a consensus; there is a persistence of disagreement decided by coercive power where the weaker party has no choice but to yield the stronger. [64] Further compromise has interpersonal and intrapersonal to reach others, one must also compromise with oneself.[65] Compromising view is commonly found in the government while at the same time they remain critical towards policies that are considered unfavorable to the public. The action raises compromise for some considerations. *The first is* a compromise by ideological similarity. Interestingly, PKB and PAN have ideological flexibility for coalition with other groups. As open Islamic parties, PKB and PAN loosen themselves from rigid ideology. Some party elites come from pluralistic background, including non-Muslims. This kind of open ideology provides space to build coalition with others including non-Islamic parties.

The second is political compromise. The political action of PKB was very much influenced by political *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) of NU. Since one of the main rules is to maintain harmony and to avoid disorder, they tend to find it easier to be close with those in power. The action of PKB and PAN subtly influenced the action of PPP and PBB in 2014 election. Coalition of PPP and PBB was taken as opportunistic–"random" coalition with no solid considerations. The initial joining of PPP with KMP and later with KIH described the parties' opportunistic side of nature. The same case was also shown by PBB toward the 2019 election by allying with strong coalition of president-vice president candidate led by PDIP.

The third is partial political compromise. This compromise is partial in practice depending on needs and timing. Party adheres solidly to its principles; one of the example is PKS's refusal to form coalition with PDIP because of ideological contrast. PKS is recognized as an Islamic party that emphasize strict and rigid Islamic norms, while PDIP is secular-nationalist party that oppose formal religion-state relationship. These contrasts have pushed them to never sit in a coalition. PKS's

---

[62] Sened, "A Model of Coalition Formation, p. 352.

[63] Meyer, *Kompromi Jalur Ideal Menuju Demokrasi*, p. 53.

[64] Hodgson, "The Role of Parties in Democracy, p. 9.

[65] Chiara Lepora, "On Compromise and Being Compromised," *Journal of Political Philosophy* 20, 1 (2012), pp. 1–22.

consistency was proven in 2014-2019 coalition. PKS was the only Islamic party that stood outside the government. Previously, PKS, PPP and PAN supported Prabowo-Hatta Rajasa. All Islamic parties except PKB were in the KMP Coalition. The change happens after their candidate was defeated. While PPP and PAN changed side and joined the government by securing a ministerial portfolio each, PKS however choose to remain in opposition along with Gerindra. PKS's choice to stand outside the ruling government was assumed to be based on ideological difference with the eventual winner, the nationalist PDIP. PKS showed their character as solid Islamic party that embraces Islamic symbols. Arguably, this also can be seen as a strategy to appeal to Muslims in Indonesia. This kind of practice is considered by Hasan[66] as an attempt to strengthen its position in the eyes of Muslim voters. However, PKS was still open to coalition with inclusive nationalist parties, such as Golkar and Demokrat. In 2019 election PKS was an ardent supporter of Prabowo-Sandi. Moreover, the party also has proclaimed itself as a religious nationalist party. It was shown by taking part in government in 2004 and 2009 when Demokrat was in power. Besides, they were also cooperative in aligning with other parties, including PKB.

At the end of the day, Islamic parties are drawn to form political compromises with the mainstream of existing coalition regardless their ideological principles. This trend happened to nationalistic Islamic parties as well as conservative ones. In addition, some Islamic parties like PPP and PKS have shown their moderate attitude by welcoming dialogues with certain nationalist parties that have moved from secular-nationalist towards nationalist-religious. Predictably, the meeting point of this tendency is more about an effort to create a momentary interest through the half-hearted coalition of each party that can change from time to time according to the needs. The half-hearted coalition' is a form of a compulsive political coalition between two interests—where both are bound by binding party norms. However, these norms are loosened or are intentionally ignored due to the limited choices of the coalition. with the chances of risks to be borne by both, such as deflation of policies or the crumbling of the coalition before its period ends. The effectiveness of the 'half-hearted coalition' pattern depends on the political benefits obtained by each party.

---

[66] Hasan, "Islamic Party, Electoral Politics, p. 43.

Continuity and Change in Coalition

Coalitions in 1999-2019 show us the direction of Islamic parties' "continuity" and "change" during this period. Continuity is closely related with ideology. In this regards, coalition will not be formed due to different ideologies; f PKS and PDIP are one example. On the one hand, PKS is an Islamic party that has held quite strict and rigid Islamic norms. On the other hand, PDIP can be said as secular with many non-Muslim members and supporters.[67] It is worth noting that Islamic parties "shift" and even have a tendency to "change side" began to appear in 2004-2009 coalitions. There are two categories of party change: the "extreme" and the "less-extreme". To give illustration, PPP in 2004supported Megawati-Hasyim Muzadi. Actually, PPPP has no common ground in terms of ideology with PDIP. One of the biggest reasons is the fact that PPP often problematized The Jakarta Charter[68] and even called for the insertion and explicit mentioning of "Islam" in Pancasila. Some might argue that there is a Hasyim Muzadi factor playing as he is a religious leader and hence justified PPP's action. Still, this argument is also arguably inaccurate considering the fact that Hasyim Muzadi is more affiliated to PKB (as Chairman of NU) than PPP.

The shift of PPP takes place after two ministerial portfolios were allocated for them by SBY-Kalla administration. Such strategy is even more visible in the 2014-2019 coalitions. PPP, PAN and PKS were together in the front line with KIH. Yet, PPP and PAN changed side after the election and join Jokowi-Kalla resulted in securing one ministerial portfolio each. Case of PPP can be classified as "extreme", since it is beyond ideological principle and has occurred repeatedly. Differs from it, PAN was categorized as more "non-extreme" due to their open ideology, which enabled them to collaborate with PDIP. In line with that, PKB has fifty-fifty chance of continuity and change. Declared as an open party, PKB was in the proper position in forming coalition and not be burdened by ideological restriction. The principle of Sunnism which emphasize social 'harmony' and 'stability' does play an important role. PKB also believes in the Islamic legal maxim saying:

---

[67] Baswedan, "Political Islam in Indonesia, p. 680.

[68] Ahmad Ali Nurdin, "Revisiting discourse on Islam and state relation in Indonesia; the views of Soekarno, Natsir and Nurcholish Madjid," *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 6, 1 (2016), p. 79.

"Ma la yudraku kulluhu la yutraku kulluhu"[69] (if you do not achieve the ideal, then it does not mean that all of it should be left; get whatever possible).

The presidential election in 2019 confronted head-to-head the candidates from 2014 election one more time. The only difference is the vice president candidates. Joko Widodo was in pair with Ma'ruf Amin, a senior Muslim cleric, the Chairman of MUI (Indonesian Ulama Council) and consultative Chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama. PKB, PPP, and along with nationalists PDIP, Nasdem, Golkar, and Hanura backed up Jokowi-Ma'ruf Amin. On the other side, Prabowo coupled up with Sandiaga Uno, a successful young entrepreneur, Gerindra's Deputy Head of Trustees, and Vice Governor of Jakarta. PAN, PKS, along with Gerindra and Demokrat are within one coalition to support the couple.

Meanwhile, PBB that made coalition with KMP since 2014 intends to play "two foots". On one side, the Chairman, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, was appointed as the lawyer of Jokowi-Ma'ruf Amin. On the other side, he allows some of PBB elites to join in Prabowo-Sandi coalition. Yusril and PBB maintain a close relationship with Prabowo and his Islamic party supporters. He also shares long history ties with PAN and PKS as they are arguably within one platform back in early Reformasi era. Moreover, PBB has a common ideology with Islamic parties supporting Prabowo, namely PKS and PAN. Speculations spreads about Yusril's political position; the disappointment towards Prabowo for the lack of "take and give" during their coalition for 2009 presidential election, is one explanation.[70] since PBB has indebted to PDIP who helped make PBB eligible participant in 2019 election.[71] Furthermore, there is also an issue of spyingfor the benefit of Prabowo. The speculation is not completely groundless, because Yusril was one of the lawyers of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) against the government.

---

[69] M. Ali Haidar, *Nahdatul Ulama dan Islam Indonesia Pendekatan Fikih Dalam Politik* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1994), p. 322.

[70] "Yusril blak-blakan alasan tinggalkan Prabowo Sandi," https://www.merdeka.com/-politik/yusril-blak-blakan-alasan-tinggalkan-prabowo-sandi.html, accessed on 17 May 2019.

[71] "Partai sekuler yang bantu PBB rupanya PDIP," https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4166870/partai-sekuler-yang-bantu-yusril-pbb-rupanya-pdip, accessed on 17 May 2019.

Considering this tendency, PPP, PAN and PBB have the characteristics of *incremental* change through quick adaptation.[72] This is the general phenomenon of party coalition in Indonesia, which is *ad hoc*,[73] temporary and based on short interests. Meanwhile, PKS was continuing and sustaining their coalition only with those that fit their value. PKB will utilize strategies of *re-orientation*[74] to keep the possibility of shift in case the current coalition fail. Re-orientation strategy is executed by having changes in party policy. PKB will have consultation with Kiai and Ulama of NU to determine their strategic policy. The political habit of NU's "*tidak mutlak-mutlakan* (flexibility and pragmatism)"[75] is considered as the main political guide of PKB. Considering the record, ideological-based coalition is less likely to occur. Even if it happens, then what will happen is "a mixture of ideology".

Theoretically, one assumes that political parties are not deterministic and static. Rather, they are dynamic over time.[76] The increase and decrease of votes in election is one of the crucial factors that have impacts on internal and external pressure of party. Citing Janda's words, "That electoral defeat could be the mother of party change is not new in the literature".[77] The loss of an election will generate internal conflicts of political parties. A party that experiences fall or defeat will adapt quickly with other parties' demands, and often will take other tactics, structure, reoriented issues, organization and goal development, from difficulties encountered. The possibility for adapting themselves into the situation is there with the condition that they are the ones suffering from Obstacles and not when rather than when get the upper hand.[78] The change occurs naturally due to internal and external pressure.

---

[72] Nadler, Tushman, "Beyond the Magic Leader, p. 537.

[73] Tamma, Nadir, "Koalisi Politik di Indonesia, p. 260.

[74] Nadler, Tushman, "Beyond the Magic Leader, p. 537.

[75] Haidar, *Nahdatul Ulama dan Islam Indonesia*, p. 322.

[76] Johan P. Olsen, "Change and Continuity: An Institutional Approach to Institution of Democratic Government," *European Political Science Review* 1, 1 (2009), p. 5.

[77] Kenneth Janda, "Toward A Performance Theory of Change in Political Parties," 12th World Congress of the International Sociological Association, Research Committee 18, Session 4, "Modelling Party Change," Madrid, Spain, July 9-13, 1990.

[78] Ibid.

According to Janda, party's change is caused by pressures from internal and external factor, or so called as party's problem "complexity".[79] In other words, Scotts mentions that environment is the factor that shapes the party's change. [80] Several factors here includes poor performance, failure to meet electorate's expectations which signed by defeat or unqualified to electoral threshold. Furthermore, the Poor performance here is caused by failure of synchronizing issues and program with social-economic situations happening during the election period. It is worsened by the fact that, other competing parties run new innovation through quick adaptations, adjusting to the electorate's predilections. [81] Therefore, pressure for change is becoming stronger both internally and externally.

The pattern of continuity and change in coalition depends on the external and internal situation. Change and adaptation of political parties that rapid and correct generate a standard in coalition. Coalition in 1999 occurred under transition and emergency state. The shift of regime from New Order to Reformasi seeks uniform views from critical Islamic groups who were treated by repression and unfairness. At the same time, Golkar still succeeds to secure and maintain its place indicated by quite large votes achieved by them. This, and the large votes gained by PDIP have triggered Islamic parties to do something and take a measure in dealing with the situation; this ended in "Poros Tengah" coalition.

Meanwhile, in normal state, ideological coalition could not be the main reason. In this regards, Imawan argues that the theory suggesting that level of civilization does correlate with political rationality characterized by its openness to other groups,[82] shall be the basis upon the loss of party's ideology. In practice, political parties coalesce for many purposes. Hence, the pragmatic coalition was taken by Islamic party since 1999. On the one hand, this is due to its wilting ideology. On the other hand, it was because no point node is able to tie Islamic parties. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that it is still possible for

---

[79] Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda, "An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 6, 3 (1994), p. 262.

[80] W. Richard Scott, *Organizations, Rational Natural and Open Syst*ems (Englewood Cliffs: Printice-Hall, 1987), p. 19.

[81] Janda, "Toward A Performance Theory of Change, p. 10.

[82] Imawan, "Partai Politik di Indonesia: Pergulatan Setengah Hati.

ideological and pragmatic coalition to happen at a time with different patterns and temporary strategies temporarily. One of the causes is political parties in Indonesia--including Islamic ones, tend to be adaptive and non-static.

Conclusion

The ideological coalition among Islamic parties in Indonesia is only reflected in the 1999 election as a form of euphoria after Islamic figures succeeded in establishing an Islam-patterned party. After Gus Dur was ousted from presidency by his allies in 2001, a shift starts to appear, from ideological coalition to pragmatic one. Ideological issues in the form of constitutional amendment—were only echoed by mediocre Islamic parties in the parliament without clear absolute support from the rest of Islamic parties. Also, the religious issues and constitutional changes that appear in every campaign are only reactions and counter narration against the hot air of the alleged reemergence of communism. These issues slowly weakened and even disappeared after the election, where Islamic parties were preoccupied by joining coalition with the ruling parties that won the election.

The opportunity for ideological debates—for instance regarding Islamic law in the constitution becomes smaller, seeing on the experience from the previous general elections. Religious debates shift from constitutional struggles to the struggle for Islamic values, which are reflected in the constitutional debates, for instance regarding pornography, almsgiving, and the Islamic economy. There starts to be a shift from the debate for Islamic ideology to Islamic culture, or more specifically a 'cultural war'. This is a response to the increasing compliance of society to Islamic teachings, or the birth of new 'pious' groups that require protection.

When ideological debates at the party-level start to weaken, they actually strengthen outside of the party. This is based on highly complex encouragements or reasons—one of which was triggered by the loosening ideology that is linked to a party. But whether or not Islamic parties obtain electoral benefit from these debates still requires further analysis.

Islamic parties do not have many choices but to take a pragmatic attitude by becoming part of the preexisting coalition. A compromising attitude becomes one of the reasons. On one side, it still maintains the interest of the constituents through the suggestions for pro-Islamic

policies and sometimes brings religious issues through campaign jargon. Yet, on the other side, it becomes part of the coalition with the ruling parties. They still feel comfortable with the political relation model through mutually beneficial reciprocal relations. In this context, compromise does not mean consensus, but there is a persistent disagreement by the compulsive power, where weak parties have no choice but to follow the coalition leader. This reason is used by Islamic parties to maintain a good relationship while avoiding conflicts.

The compromising coalition practices in Indonesia allow an antagonistic discourse to be managed to live side by side with the reason of plurality and the very high demand of the constituents towards the parties' performances. Even though in the end, narrations such as 'dating but are unromantic', 'strange bedfellow', and 'not to toe the coalition line' are easily found. They emerge as a small ripple in this kind of coalition. Whenever parties in the coalition disagree, they criticize and even deflate policies of ruling party(s) that they support. However, these ripples can be managed well by the coalitions under the name of greater social and national interests. This is a consequence of the 'half-hearted coalition' consisting of the multi-party electoral politics with various cultures and ideologies.

For Indonesian Islamic parties, compromising coalitions become the most rational choice as there is ever limited chance for an ideological coalition. But it does not prevent the prospect for an ideological coalition in the future, even on a smaller scale, at the local level. Meanwhile, at the national level, ideological coalitions have lost their momentum—except if a new momentum that is as strong as that at the beginning of the *Reformasi*. As for the moment, Islamic parties are already in a comfortable position when they are on a great ship with other parties. The compromising choice is not only carried out by moderate and accommodative Islamic parties such as PKB and PAN but is also carried out by conservative parties such as PBB, PPP and even PKS.[]

References

Aspinall, Edward. "Democratization: Travails and achievements." Robert W. Hefner (ed). *Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Indonesia.* Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2018

Amir, Zainal Abidin. *Peta Islam Politik Pasca-Soeharto.* Jakarta: LP3ES, 2003.

Ambardi, Kuskridho. "The Making of Indonesian Multiparty System:A Cartelized Party System and Its Origin." Ph.D Dissertation The Ohio State University, 2008.

Baswedan, Anies Rasyid. "Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future Trajectory." *Asian Survey* 44, 5 (2004).

Bettcher, Kim Eric. "Factions of Interest in Japan and Italy: The Organizational and Motivational Dimensions of Factionalism." *Party Politics* 11, 3 (2005).

Bourchier, David M. "Two Decades of Ideological Contestation in Indonesia: From Democratic Cosmopolitanism to Religious Nationalism." *Journal of Contemporary Asia* (2019).

Casani, Alfonso. "Cross-Ideological Coalitions under Authoritarian Regimes: Islamist-Left Collaboration among Morocco's Excluded Opposition." *Democratization* 27, 7 (2020).

Carothers, Thomas. *Confronting the Weakest Link: Aiding Political Parties.* Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment in International Peace, 2006.

Dorey, Peter and Mark Garnett. *The Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Gavernment 2010-2015.* London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

Duile, Timo and Jonas Bens. "Indonesia and the 'Conflictual Consensus': A Discursive Perspective on Indonesian Democracy." *Critical Asian Studies* 49, 2 (2017).

Fitch-Roy, Oscar, Jenny Fairbrass, and David Benson. "Ideas, Coalitions and Compromise: Reinterpreting EU-ETS Lobbying through Discursive Institutionalism." *Journal of European Public Policy* 27, 1 (2020).

Fossati, Diego. "The Resurgence of Ideology in Indonesia: Political Islam, *Aliran* and Political Behaviour." *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 38, 2 (2019).

Gyene, Pal. "Democracy, Islam and Party System in Indonesia: Towards a Consensus-Oriented Model." *PCD (Power Conflict Democracy) Journal* 7, 1 (2019).

Hamayotsu, Kikue. "The End of Political Islam? A Comparative Analysis of Religious Parties in the Muslim Democracy of Indonesia." *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 30, 3 (2011).

Harmel, Robert and Kenneth Janda. "An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 6, 3 (1994).

Hasan, Noorhaidi. "Islamist Party, Electoral Politics and Da'wa Mobilization among Youth: The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia." *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 6, 1 (2012).

Hodgson, James David. "The Role of Parties in Democracy: Coalitions and an Ethic of Compromise." *Representation* 57, 3 (2021).

Haidar, M. Ali. *Nahdatul Ulama dan Islam Indonesia Pendekatan Fikih Dalam Politik*. Jakarta: Gramedia, 1994.

Imawan, Riswanda. *Partai Politik di Indonesia: Pergulatan Setengah Hati Mencari Jati Diri*. Yogyakarta: Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2004.

Janda, Kenneth. "Toward A Performance Theory of Change in Political Parties." 12th World Congress of the International Sociological Association, Research Committee 18, Session 4, "Modelling Party Change," Madrid, Spain, July 9-13, 1990.

Lepora, Chiara. "On Compromise and Being Compromised." *Journal of Political Philosophy* 20, 1 (2012).

Lay, Cornelis. "Democratic Transition in Local Indonesia: An Overview of Ten Years Democracy." *Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik* 15, 3 (2012).

Mietzner, Marcus. *Money, Power, and Ideology: Political parties in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia*. Singapore: Southeast Asian Publications Series, NUS Press, 2013

----------. "Coercing Loyalty: Coalitional Presidentialism and Party Politics in Jokowi's In Indonesia." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 38, 2 (2016).

McIntyre, Angus. "Megawati Sukarnoputri: From President's Daughter to Vice President". *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, Vol. 32, No. 1-2 (2000):95-118.

Abdul Chalik

Minardi, Anton. "The New Islamic Revivalism In Indonesia: Accommodationist and Confrontationist." *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 12, 2 (2018).

Macridis, Roy C. "Sejarah, Fungsi dan Tipologi Partai-partai." Ichlasul Amal (ed), *Teori-teori Mutakhir Partai Politik*. Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana, 1996.

Mukrimin. "Islamic Parties and politics of constitutionalism di Indonesia." *Journal of Indonesia Islam* 6, 2 (2012).

Nurdin, Ahmad Ali. "Revisiting discourse on Islam and state relation in Indonesia; the views of Soekarno, Natsir and Nurcholish Madjid." *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 6, 1 (2016).

Nurhasim, Moch. *Masa Depan Partai Islam Di Indonesia Studi Tentang Volatilitas Elektroral Dan Faktor-Faktor Penyebabnya.* Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar and LIPI, 2016.

Noor, Firman. "Perilaku politik pragmatis dalam kehidupan politik kontemporer; kajian atas menyurutnya peran ideologi politik di era reformasi." *Masyarakat Indonesia* 40, 1 (2014).

Olsen, Johan P. "Change and Continuity: An Institutional Approach to Institution of Democratic Government." *European Political Science Review* 1, 1 (2009).

Pepinsky, Thomas, R William Liddle, and Saiful Mujani. "Indonesian Democracy and the Transformation of Political Islam." https://courses.cit.cornell.edu/tp253/docs/transformation.pdf

----------. "Testing Islam's Political Advantage: Evidence from Indonesia." *American Journal of Political Science,* 56 (2012).

Power, Thomas S. "Jokowi's Authoritarian Turn and Indonesia's Democratic Decline." *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 54, 3 (2018).

Rahmat, M. Imdatun. *Arus Baru Islam Radikal Transmisi Revivalisme Islam Timur Tengah Ke Indonesia.* Jakarta: Penerbit Erlangga, 2006.

Riker, William H. *The Theory of Political Coalitions.* New Haven/New York: Yale University Press, 1962.

Romli, Lili. "Crescent and Electoral Strength: Islamic Party Portrait of Reform Era In Indonesia." *International Journal of Islamic Thought* 4 (2013).

Saleem, Raja M. Ali. "Identifying Islamist Parties Using Gunther and Diamond's Typology." *SAGE Open* 4, 3 (2014).

Santoso, Purwo. "In The Name of Democracy; Commoditization of Religions by Political Parties in Indonesia." *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 4, 1 (2010).

Sartori, Giovanni. *Party and Party System; A Framework for Analysis*. Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

Sened, Itai. "A Model of Coalition Formation: Theory and Evidence." *The Journal of Politics* 58, 2 (1996).

Scott, W. Richard. *Organizations, Rational Natural and Open Systems*. Englewood Cliffs: Printice-Hall, 1987.

Tavist, Margit. "Principle vs Pragmatism: Policy Shift and Political Competition." *American Journal of Political Science* 51, 1 (2007).

Tamma, Sukri and Sakinah Nadir. "Koalisi Politik di Indonesia Pasca Soeharto." *Jurnal Review Politik* 3, 2 (2013).

Ufen, Andreas. "From *Aliran* to Dealignment: Political Parties in Post-Suharto Indonesia." *South East Asia Research* 16, 1 (2008).

Woodward, Mark. "Indonesia's Religious Political Parties: Democratic Consolidation and Security in Post-New Order Indonesia." *Asian Security* 4, 1 (2008).

Yunanto, Sri and Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid. "Fragmentations and Conflict Among Islamic Political Parties in Indonesia during Reformasi Era (1998-2009): Anatomy, Factors and Implications." *Journal of Indonesia Islam* 7, 2 (2013).

Internet Sources

"Hidayat wacanakan koalisi partai Islam di Pilpres 2009", https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2008/07/29/01035486/hidayat.wacanakan.koalisi.partai.islam.di.pilpres.2009. accessed on 28 June 2020.

"Ini penyebab PPP keluar dari koalisi Prabowo dan gabung ke Jokowi", https://www.merdeka.com/politik/ini-penyebab-ppp-keluar-dari-koalisi-prabowo-gabung-ke-jokowi.html. accessed on 8 July 2019.

"Komisi Pemilihan Umum, Hasil Hitung Suara Legislatif DPR RI 2019", https://pemilu2019.kpu.go.id/#/dprri/hitung-suara/ , accessed on 22 January 2021.

"Partai sekuler yang bantu PBB rupanya PDIP", https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4166870/partai-sekuler-yang-bantu-yusril-pbb-rupanya-pdip, accessed on 17 May 2019.

"Pimpin PAN, janji kampanye Zulkifli langsung ditagih", https://nasional.tempo.co/read/646431/pimpin-pan-janji-kampanye-zulkifli-hasan-langsung-ditagih, accessed on 17 May 2019.

"Tolakan dari kursi Islam." https://majalah.tempo.co/read/nasional/95470/tolakan-dari-kursi-islam accessed on 28 June 2020.

"Yusril blak-blakan alasan tinggalkan PrabowoSandi", https://www.merdeka.com/politik/yusril-blak-blakan-alasan-tinggalkan-prabowo-sandi.html, accessed on 17 May 2019.