

## THE NEW ISLAMIC REVIVALISM IN INDONESIA Accommodationist and Confrontationist

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**Abstract:** Islamic politics has become an integral part of Indonesia's political history. This qualitative study investigates Prosperous Justice Party/*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (PKS) and *Hiżb at-Tahrir* Indonesia (HTI) as two new Islamic movements, which are involved much in current political constellation in Indonesia. The study reveals that the stream of thought and strategy of PKS and HTI concerning on politics, state, and sharia differ. PKS tends to be accommodationist revivalists, whereas HTI is likely to be confrontationists revivalists. The accommodationists believe that any values or doctrines, which exist within society should not be rejected as long as it is not at odds with Islamic teachings. While Confrontationist revivalists argue that any system not derived from Islam assumed as the cause of all forms of crisis, especially the moral and political turmoil, and causes Muslims away from the implementation of Islamic teachings. With regard to the relation between Islam and state, PKS activists argue that Islam does not standardize the concept of the state, but it only gives basic principles. Nevertheless, Islam and politics cannot be separated because Islam covers political affairs and the statehood accommodationist and confrontational revivalist Muslim.

**Keywords:** Islamic Revivalist, Prosperous Justice Party, New Movement.

### Introduction

In political life, Islam offers the widest horizon of thought in various formulations of ideas on social and legal norms, new virtues and aspirations. Islam provides the most effective symbols for political mobilization, whether to arouse people to defend a regime or to fight a regime that is considered to lack legitimacy.

In Indonesia, Islamic politic has become part of the national political constellation. One of the issues that have appeared either as

discourse or as an Islamic movement is the compatibility between the state and Islam. Regarding to this, there are two type of Islamic groups. First group is the form of national political system such as the Party of Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations/*Majelis Shura Muslimin Indonesia* (Masyumi) party during old order era<sup>1</sup> and the Justice Party Prosperous/*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (PKS) during the reform era. The second group is non-political system such as *Darul Islam* (DI) and *Hizbut Tabrir* (HT).

During old order, the Masyumi failed to restore the Jakarta Charter as the state constitution. Further, the Islamic political activists hope that new order regime could accommodate the Muslims aspirations to apply Islamic sharia as a whole in laws and constitution. In addition, they expected three points from the new order regime. First, the release of their leaders from detention. Second, the rehabilitation of the Masyumi party that Sukarno disbanded. Third, re-entering the seven words of the Jakarta Charter into the state constitution to implement sharia Islam<sup>2</sup>.

However, those expectations could not be obtained because the leaders of the new order, who mostly were the military, considered that the rehabilitation of the Masyumi and its leaders and the effort to establish an Islamic state would disturb the integrity of the country. Although the Masyumi actually opposed the Islamic revolution, some leaders of Masyumi involved in the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia/*Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia* (PRRI), a subversive government set up in Sumatra to oppose the central government of Indonesia in 1958. It was one of the reasons, why the military leaders refused to rehabilitate the Masyumi and release its leaders. Meanwhile, concerning re-entering the seven words of the Jakarta Charter into the state constitution raised highly controversial issues and resulted never-ending fierce debate in People's Consultative Assembly/*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* (MPR) in 1996.

Furthermore, the government applied the carrot and stick approach to the Muslim demands. The government actively pursued various political initiatives that considered could attack the national

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<sup>1</sup> Maswadi Rauf, *Konsensus Politik Sebuah Penjajagan Teoritis* (Jakarta: Direktorat Jenderal Pendidikan Tinggi, Departemen Pendidikan Nasional, 2000), p. 126.

<sup>2</sup> C.W. Watson, "Muslims and the State in Indonesia", Hussin Mutalib and Taj ul-Islam Hashmi (eds), *Islam, Muslims and the Modern State* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p. 174.

stability, while at the same time encourage the development in the field of religious ritual education and practice. This condition was a portrait of the relationship between the Muslims and the state in Indonesia since the mid-1960s.

Dealing with this situation, the Islamic political activists who demanded the enforcement of sharia Islam responded through three actions. First, they increased the political demands (application of Islamic values) within the state. Second, they increased self-awareness of the Muslim community (concerning the importance of an Islamic state). Third, they embrace extra parliamentary powers to protest and campaign the enforcement of Islamic values within the state<sup>3</sup>.

The new order government responded the actions by using secularization technique once practiced by Snouck Hurgronje, a Dutch colonial agent, it was separation between religion and politics which basically against Islamic teachings as Islam covers various aspects of human life, from political to government affairs. The secularization aimed to lame the Muslim leadership and exacerbated it and to keep the Muslim commitment from the political world.

It can be seen from the separation of Pancasila, foundational philosophical theory of the Indonesian state, which was taught in the course Pancasila Moral Education/*Pendidikan Moral Pancasila* (PMP), and the Guidance of Practice and the Pancasila/*Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila* (P4) with the religious education. Another evidence was the motto '*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*' the official national motto of Indonesia which means unity in diversity, has been interpreted excessively through generalizing that all religions is the same, with the reason to keep the unity of the nation.

Additionally, although the first precepts of Pancasila, and the Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution have guaranteed the freedom of religion, but in practice not all religious teachings, especially the Islamic teachings could be exercised by the adherents. The policy to establish Pancasila as the Single Principle (*Asas Tunggal*) for all civil society organizations, political parties, and the government often presented a repressive attitude towards Islamic activists when conveying their aspirations. For instance, the Muslim adherents were only allowed to practice their religious teachings were related to their personal affairs such as marriage, inheritance and guardianship.

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

Meantime, the other efforts to implement the Islamic sharia in the state in Indonesia were conducted by the Muslims through various ways, i.e some participated in implementing the agreed development agenda through government channels, and some did the movement with a number of actions and protests outside the prevailing government system. The condition continued until the reforms era in 1998. The relationship between the government (state) and the diverse elements of Islamic society at the time was different depend on the issue that developed by the Islamic community. When the ideas referred to the Islamic ideology as the ideology of the country, the government provided an antagonistic attitude. On the contrary, when the ideas supported the existing systems, the government was accommodative.<sup>4</sup>

The other efforts to apply Islamic sharia in the government continued rolling through various Islamic movements such as in the form of a political party, and mass movement. Some Islamic political parties participated in the General Election in 1999. The parties were the United Development Party/*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (PPP), Justice Party/*Partai Keadilan* (PK) which later renamed as the Prosperous Justice Party/*Partai Keadilan Sosial* (PKS), the National Awakening Party/*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* (PKB) and the Crescent Star Party/*Partai Bulan Bintang* (PBB). This PBB is actually often identified by New Masyumi Party. Out of those parties, PBB and PKS blatantly support the application of Islamic sharia. Meanwhile, mass Islamic organizations were the Islamic Defenders Front/*Front Pembela Islam* (FPI), the Lasykar Jihad, the Mujahidin Council of Indonesia/*Majelis Muslim Indonesia* (MMI), and Liberation Party/*Hizb at-Tabrir* (HT).

However, the Islamic movement was generally dissatisfied with the ongoing conditions. They wanted to make radical changes in the system of government and society.<sup>5</sup> According to Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, the demands of a number of activists who voiced (sharia) Islam actually concerning to the upholding of justice.<sup>6</sup> Some organization that were not in the form of a political party actively voiced. In August 2000, they proposed the Annual Session/*Sesi*

<sup>4</sup> Abdul Azis Thaba, *Islam dan Negara* (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1998).

<sup>5</sup> Arief B. Iskandar, "Dilema Penerapan Syari'at Islam di Negara Sekuler", *al-Wa'ie*, No. 11 (2001).

<sup>6</sup> Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, *Dinamika Sistem Politik Indonesia* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1993).

*Tabunan* (ST) of the People's Consultative Assembly/*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* (MPR) to include the Jakarta Charter/*Piagam Jakarta* (PJ), "the state is based on the One Supreme Godship with the obligation to observe the Islamic sharia for its adherents", into the Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution.

These attempts again failed in the trial. The secular parties, and several Islamic based parties opposed them, as well as and the two largest Islamic organizations, NU and Muhammadiyah disagreed with the Islamic sharia within the state, the Islamic sharia according to them supposed to be applied by the society.<sup>7</sup> As a result, the session of the Constituent Assembly in 1955, ultimately failed to include the PJ in the 1945 Constitution.

The political reforms took place in Indonesia began after the fall of Soeharto, the president of the New Order. In this era, the democratization faucet and change tunnel were opened toward the nation and state matters. Reform was the momentum of change for the life of the nation and the state, which included the re-arrangement and recover of the constitution and various aspects related to the economics, politics, and culture considered mistaken in the past.

The reforms that was gone through in Indonesia led to the transition conditions, in terms of both leadership and the government system. This transition was an appropriate momentum to provide fundamental input for the establishment of an ideal system of government to support political, economic, and social systems.<sup>8</sup> It is at this moment that many Muslims hope to be able to transform Islamic values into the system of government and society

In the reform era, the establishment of an Islamic state was no longer the focus of the conversation. It had shifted to the application of Islamic law within the nation and the state. The implementation of Islamic sharia later become the discourse of Indonesian society particularly among the intellectuals. The discussion was also limited around the law of inheritance, marriage, divorce, and reconciliation. The discourse of Islamic law enforcement/*Syariat Islam* (SI) reappeared in different regions such as the province of *Nangroe Aceh Darussalam* (NAD) that had long demanded its enforcement, some areas in West

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<sup>7</sup> Deliar Noer, *Islam & Politik* (Jakarta: Yayasan Risalah, 2003).

<sup>8</sup> Juan J. Linz, *Menjauhi Demokrasi Kaum Penjabat* (Bandung: Mizan, 2001).

Java province included Banten, Cianjur, Garut, Tasikmalaya and others.

After a long struggle, the Local Regulation/Peraturan Daerah (Perda) of Aceh Number 5 year 2000 on the Implementation of Islamic sharia was issued, it also was strengthened by the Law No. 18 of 2001 stipulated the name of Aceh Province as *Nangroe Aceh Darussalam* (NAD) province and having special autonomy status. Followed by Presidential Decree/Keputusan Presiden (Keppres) number 11 year 2003 regarding the Sharia Court in Aceh. Other regions were still struggling to get the provisions to implement the SI, which is further defined as Perda.<sup>9</sup>

To obtain clear description about the Islamic movement in Indonesia done by both the Islamic politic and non-Islamic politic party, it is interested to investigate more deeply the Islamic movement in the Islamic political constellation in Indonesia. There are two moves that interesting to be investigated specifically in terms of the thinking of the state and the movement of realizing the thinking, namely the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and *Hizb at-Tabrir* (HT) or the Liberation Party. Both are political Islam organizations that voice Islam in the practice of society and state, with a network of *da'wa* and different methods.

Both are differ in the state ideas and methods of implementation. PKS does not mention the struggle to establish an Islamic state, while HT championed it. In addition, the two movements are getting a place in various circles in Indonesia, especially among the intellectual and economic middle. For example, the PK which in the 1999 Election received only 1.4 million votes (1.7% of voters) with 7 seats in the DPR, jumped to 8.3 million votes in the 2004 elections (7.34% of voters) with 45 seats in the DPR . While HT at the beginning of the reform of 1998 only got support among students at several universities on the island of Java, but now it has recruited various circles in the country.

### **Streams of Islamic Thought in Indonesia**

The views on the relationship of religion and state in Islam are varied. The differences led to a political orientation that emphasizes the implementation of Islamic sharia as the foundation of government

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<sup>9</sup> See Kamaruzzaman Bustaman-Ahmad, "The Application of Islamic Law in Indonesia: The Case Study in Aceh", *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 1, 1 (2007): pp. 135-180.

and state. Some argue that Islam and the state are a coherent of *dien* (religion), *dunya* (world), and *daulah* (state). Some said that although Islam is not only about the issue of ritual, but Islam also does not put a standard pattern on the theory of the country, while the other developed the idea that Islam is separate from state affairs. Such a division can be derived from the thought of Munawir Sadzali<sup>10</sup> as shown in table 1.

**Table 1.** The Streams of Islamic Thought

Streams	Thought
Fundamentalist	Islam concerns all aspects of life including political and state issues
Modernist	Islam provides principles in the field of life, but does not cover the subject of detail in terms of government or state
Secularist	Islam regulate ritual matters and do not regulate political and state affairs

Those with an Islamic political orientation, positioned by Bahtiar Effendy on two different spectra. First, the group who view that Islam should be the basis of the state; that sharia should be accepted as the state constitution; that political sovereignty is in the hands of God; that the idea of a nation state contradicts the concept of the *ummah* (Islamic community) which has no political or regional boundaries; and that the application of the concept of *shūrah* is different from the idea of democracy. Second, the group who state that Islam does not put a standard pattern on the state theory (political system) that must be run by the *ummah*.<sup>11</sup>

**Table 2.** Political Islam

Spectrum	Political Thought
Formalist	Islam has the concept of the state, for that Islam should be the basis of the state
Substantialist	Islam do not define the concept of the state by default but only provide the main principles of political and state issues, for which the principles must be implemented

<sup>10</sup> Munawir Sadzali, *Islam dan Tata Negara: Ajaran, Sejarah, dan Pemikiran* (Jakarta: UI Press, 1993).

<sup>11</sup> Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam dan Negara Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktik Politik Islam di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 2001).

The idea of the Islamic state in the 20<sup>th</sup> century started from a drastically world changed condition, mainly due to the Western invasion that necessitated the rise of Muslims. According to Nikki R. Keddie “the rise of modern Islam has actually been born since the 19<sup>th</sup> century, through a campaign echoed by the Young Ottomans concerning the importance of reformist Pan-Islamists. Such the idea was born of a prominent reformer Jamaluddin Al-Afghani who received Shiite education in Iran”.<sup>12</sup> The ideas developed by Afghani were inseparable from his life experience at the time, so that his movements essentially advocated against Islam from the western invasion.<sup>13</sup>

The ideas according to Hamid Enayat continued by his students namely Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) and Muhammad Rashid Ridha (1865-1935). Both are Egyptians and later known to develop the theories of the state according to Islam. Abduh combined humanism and modern rationalism with the early life of Islam (salafiah), while Rida increasingly developed the state theories that become the doctrine for the fundamentalists in the future. Furthermore, Rasyid Rida’s thoughts are believed to have a major influence on the formation of the ideology of Muslim Brotherhood activists (founded by Hasan Al-Banna, 1928) in Egypt and other activists in the Sunni Muslim world.<sup>14</sup>

The spirit of Islamic renewal then spreaded to all other Islamic movements in the world. In 1947, Abul A’la Al-Maududi founded Jami’ati Islami in India (1947), then developed in Pakistan. In 1953, *Hizb at-Tabrir* was established in Palestine. The similar movement were Syarikat Islam (1905), Muhammadiyah (1912), Islamic Unity (1922) and Nahdlatul Ulama (1926) in Indonesia which have been the driving force of independence in 1945. The other later movements that criticized the secular government, and its various injustices, and demanded the enactment of Islamic sharia, which Oliver Roy referred to as fundamentalist Islam, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, *Hizb at-Tabrir*, *Jama’ati Islami*, and Islamic Salvation Front (FIS).<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Nikki R. Keddie, “Sayyid Jamal al-Din ‘al-Afghani,’” Ali Rahnama (ed.), *Pioneers of Islamic Revival* (London, UK: Zed Book Ltd., 1994), pp. 11-24.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Hamid Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought* (London: Macmillan Press, 1982).

<sup>15</sup> Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994).



In Indonesia ideological movements reappeared at the momentum of reform and never disappeared in the political arena. The rising of Islamic movement after the New Order according to Khamami Zada was characterized by two specific characteristics, the structure, and culture.

The first is characterized by the rise of the establishment of Islamic parties. Among the parties are the Crescent Star Party/*Partai Bulan Bintang* (PBB), the Justice Party/*Partai keadilan* (PK), the Ummah Awakening Party/*Partai Kebangkitan Umat* (PKU), the Nahdlatul Ummah Party/*Partai Nahdlatul Ummat* (PNU), the Islam Community Party/*Partai Umat Islam* (PUI), the Neo Masyumi/*Masyumi Baru*, the Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII) 1905, the Masyumi Islamic Political Party/Masyumi, and the United Partai/*Partai Persatuan* (PP). Previously, the united Development Party/*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (PPP) existed firstly in the New Order era.

The second type is characterized by the proliferation of a number of Islamic mass organizations, such as the Islamic Defenders Front/*Front Pembela Islam* (FPI), the Laskar Jihad, the Mujahidin Council of Indonesia/*Majelis Muslim Indonesia* (MMI), and Liberation Party/*Hizb at-Tabrir* (HT), Ikhwanul Muslimin, and Majelis Mujahidin and others. The movements established in the New Order era, such as the Indonesian Committee for the Solidarity of the Islamic World/*Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam* (KISDI) and the Indonesian Muslim Workers Union/*Persatuan Pekerja Muslim Indonesia* (PPMI). The Islamic movement (mass organizations) is characterised by its formalistic, militant, and radical characters.<sup>16</sup>

### **Prosperous Justice Party and *Hizbut Tahrir* Indonesia: A Comparative Perspective**

Since the reform era, amounts of Islamic organizations that are oriented to the implementation of Islamic teachings emerge. The organizations differ in shape and pattern of the movement, such as political parties and community organizations. The emergence of revivalist *da'wa* movement in Indonesia in mid-1998 based on several things as follows:

First, the ideas of Islam that have been buried get the opportunity to be presented more freely because the reform era government is

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<sup>16</sup> Khamami Zada, *Islam Radikal* (Jakarta: Teraju, (2002).

more tolerant toward the Moslem aspirations. Second, the reformation as a transitional period give a chance for Islamic activist to promote their Islamic values into the government and state system. Third, the moral crisis occurred among the leaders and the society as well as the secularization in all areas and the economic crisis that caused abnormal condition.

In line with this, the existence of Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and *Hizbut Tabrir* Indonesia (HTI) in the political arena of Indonesia is a blessing of reform era. Both organizations are the representation of two major Indonesian Islamic groups who want to implement Islamic sharia and to hold Islamic government.

PKS, born from *tarbiyah* movement mostly done on campuses, schools and offices, chose to promote the implementation Islamic values and *sharia* through political parties. PKS chose the way by defining that Islam is *syumul* (perfect system), namely *thawābit* and *mutaghayyirāt*. *Thawābit* is the standard of thing that should not change for any reason whenever and wherever. It is the binding of *wala* (loyalty), love, and defense. It also a demarcation boundary between faith and *kufr*. Whereas *mutaghayyirāt* is changeable matters that based on *ijtihad* as it is not explained by the Qur'an or Sunnah explicitly. PKS stipulates that the application of Islamic shariah is *thawābit*, while the steps of its realization is *mutaghayyirāt*.<sup>17</sup>

According to Tate Qamaruddin, PKS established in 1998 that initially named PK then changed to PKS in 2000.<sup>18</sup> As a *da'wa* chain, PKS seeks to apply *sharia* in all levels of life, including private life, family life, organizational life, social life, and political life. Therefore, PKS believes that the practice of Islam is inseparable from political life.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Kamarudin, *Partai Politik Islam di Pentas Reformasi: Refleksi Pemilu 1999 untuk Pemilu 2004* (Jakarta: Visi Publishing, 2003).

<sup>18</sup> See, Yon Machmudi, *Islamising Indonesia: the Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)* (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2008); Arief Munandar, "Antara Jemaah Dan Partai Politik: Dinamika Habitus Kader Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) dalam Arena Politik Indonesia Pasca Pemilu 2004" (Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, Universitas Indonesia – Jakarta, 2011).

<sup>19</sup> Noorhaidi Hasan, "Islamist Party, Electoral Politics and Da'wah Mobilization among Youth: The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia", *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 6, 1 (2012): pp. 17-47.

While HTI that emerged in Indonesia in 1984 struggles to enforce Islamic *sharia* within a state of the Caliphate. According to HTI activists the struggle in order to uphold the *khilāfah* state required by Allah Swt., in the Qur'an (Ali Imran 3:104) through the establishment of a political party.<sup>20</sup> In carrying out the mission HTI rejects various methods of applying the sharia which he deems erroneous i.e. *tadarruj* (gradually), fighting rulers, fatalism who assume that one day the *khilāfah* will return, and individualism. The correct method is the method executed by *rasūlullāh* Saw., namely establishing an Islamic State. The first stage is to build cadres. Second, interact with people. Third, gain power.<sup>21</sup>

In addition, HTI activists are convinced that Muslim not allowed (*ḥarām*) to adopt, apply, and disseminate any methods including socialism, communism and democracy. Therefore, they refuse to engage and participate in the government that uses the democratic system because according to the leader of HTI,<sup>22</sup> democracy has brought humans mired in degrees of dirty animals in the sense of freedom of conduct. Additionally, democracy has evidently created various crises, calamities, and exploitation of the colonized and underdeveloped people.<sup>23</sup>

**Table 3.** PKS-HTI Responses to Democracy

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Response to Democracy</b>
PKS	Democracy is a social place to choose someone to lead people affairs. They are able to dismiss him if they misbehave, nor should they be brought to an economic, social, cultural or political system that they do not know and dislike. Anyone who wants to contemplate the essence of democracy will surely find similarity with the Islamic

<sup>20</sup> Syabab Hizb at-Tahrir, *Bagaimana Membangun Kembali Khilafah* (Bogor: Pustaka Thariqul Izzah, 2004). Also see, Burhanuddin Muhtadi, "The Quest for Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia", *Asian Journal of Social Science* 37 (2009): pp. 623–645

<sup>21</sup> Ibid. See also Masdar Hilmy, "Manufacturing the 'Ontological Enemy': Socio-Political Construction of anti-Democracy Discourses among HTI Activists in Post-New Order Indonesia", *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 3, 2 (2009), pp. 341-369.

<sup>22</sup> Abdul Qadim Zallum, *Demokrasi Sistem Kafir Haram Mengambil, Menerapkan dan Menyebarkanluaskannya* (Bogor: Pustaka Thariqul Izzah, 2003).

<sup>23</sup> See also, Ali Maksum, "Discourses on Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: A Study on the Intellectual Debate between Liberal Islam Network (JIL) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI)", *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 11, 2 (2017), pp. 405-422.

Organization	Response to Democracy
HTI	<p>principle, except for the democratic qualities that are incompatible with Islam, namely: 1. Popular democracy in the West the is definition of nation or <i>ummah</i> bounded by region, climate, blood, ethnicity, language and crystallized customs. 2. The goals of modern western democracy or the democracy that exists in every age are worldly and material objectives. 3. The sovereignty of the people according to western democracy is a people's absoluteness as the supreme power holder regardless of ignorance, tyranny, or immorality.</p> <p>A democracy actually is <i>kufr</i> system. Democracy is at odds with Islamic laws, both globally and in particular. Democracy was born from European leaders who claimed that a ruler was God's representative on the earth and entitled to govern the people according to his power. They assume that God has given them the absolute authority to rule the people by their own rules, for their power rests on God-sourced power, not from the people. As a result they freely oppressed and controlled the people as well as slavery, then the conflict arose between the European rulers and their people, who awakened the philosophers and thinkers to develop the concept of the people's government system, the democratic system.</p>

### ***Accommodationist and Confrontationist Perspective***

Some characteristics of thought and strategy conducted by HTI and PKS as mentioned above considered as the part of revivalists' movement, that is who want to arouse Islamic legal (sharia) as the platform statehood and nationality. Nevertheless, both Islamic organizations have different ways; PKS tends to be accommodationist revivalists, whereas HTI is likely to be confrontationists revivalists.

The accommodationists believe that any values or doctrines, which exist within society should not be rejected as long as it is not at odds with Islamic teachings. While Confrontationist revivalists argue that any system not derived from Islam assumed as the cause of all forms of crisis, especially the moral and political turmoil, and causes Muslims away from the implementation of Islamic teachings.

**Table 4.** New Models of Islamic Movement

Organization	Islamic Understanding	Type of Movement	Nature of Movement
PKS	Islam is a perfect teaching that covers things that are <i>thawābit</i> and <i>mutaghayyirāt</i> .	Revivalist	Accommodationist
HTI	Islam is perfect teaching that has governed all the affairs as well as the way how to realise it.	Revivalist	Confrontationist

Besides, they also differ in the way to conceptualize the relation between Islam and state. According to PKS, Islam does not standardize the concept of the state, but it only gives basic principles. Nevertheless, Islam and politics cannot be separated because Islam covers political affairs and the statehood. (see table 5).

**Table 5.** Relations between Islam and the State According to PKS-HTI

Organization	Islam and Politics Relations	Realization
PKS	Islam does not standardize the concept of the state, but it only gives basic principles. Nevertheless, between Islam and politics cannot be separated because Islam covers political affairs and the statehood.	Cooperatif
HTI	Islam is a perfect teaching. Therefore, Islam organizes all issues in life, including political and state issues	Non Cooperatif

**Table 6.** Actualization of State Concept According to PKS-HTI

Organization	Actualization Stages	Tactical Steps
PKS	To reinforce the spiritual value To make total and radical changes regarding various fundamental aspects of life. To maintain the potential of the good society	To introduce Islamic thought to the community as follows: Explaining the right to freedom of thought Presenting in detail the nature of <i>jama'ah</i> Revitalization of the role of ' <i>ulama'</i> ' in politics.

Organization	Actualization Stages	Tactical Steps
HTI	<p>Developing cadres</p> <p>Interacting with the <i>ummah</i> to gain support</p> <p>Gaining power without violence.</p>	<p>Placing politics as controlling activities.</p> <p>To establish and choose Effective institutions as the medium of struggle.</p> <p>To engage parliament and to mobilize mass</p> <p>Fostering individuals through <i>halaqah</i>.</p> <p>Conveying Islamic thoughts to <i>ummah</i> through public lectures and discussions.</p> <p>Fighting the ideology, rules, and opinion which are rooted from <i>kufir</i>.</p> <p>Doing political struggle to oppose pagan countries by exposing their evil.</p> <p>Serving people following the Islamic sharia</p>

**Table 7.** Bureaucracy Problems and Solutions

PKS	HTI
<p><b>Problems:</b></p> <p>Destruction in all sectors.</p> <p>Be a nest of KKN (corruption, collusion, and nepotism).</p> <p>Not professional in running the wheels of government.</p> <p><b>Solutions:</b></p> <p>Enter into the bureaucracy and occupy a strategic position with morals <i>karīmah</i> (noble).</p> <p>Establish an independent forum for government employees.</p> <p>Combating Corruption, upholding</p>	<p><b>Problems:</b></p> <p>The state becomes capitalist.</p> <p>The position of the state as producer and the people as consumers.</p> <p>Corruption is everywhere.</p> <p><b>Solutions:</b></p> <p>Every parish must be involved in politics and must be a statesman. Statesman is a person who thinks about the interests of the <i>ummah</i> is not selfish or his group, although he is a laborer, ordinary employee or farmer.</p>

<b>PKS</b>	<b>HTI</b>
honesty, fairness, simplicity and professional in serving the community.	Fighting the fate and welfare of the people according to the guidance of Islamic sharia .
Controls actively.	take over the leadership of the people by forming influential groups or powers so as to be able to oppose the government and ultimately seize control of the government.

In short, PKS and HTI have different ways in transforming those ideas. First, in terms of politics, they differ fundamentally in conceptualizing Islamic state, namely PKS develops the conception of state within the national territorial sphere, whereas HTI stands up for a world state. Second, in regards to the realization of the idea, the PKS is more accommodative with democracy system, while HTI is more opposed to the existence of democracy. Third, concerning on the strategy of implementation of sharia, PKS represent a structural, activism, movement, and accommodative, whereas HTI uses cultural, thought, and confrontational movement.

### **Conclusion**

This study succeeded in explaining several things related to the pattern of the post-reform era revivalist Islamic movement. The scholars' viewpoint regarding the categories of traditionalist and modernist Muslims seems to do not entirely appropriate to analyze the phenomenon of the Islamic movement lately. It can be seen that the PKS and HTI movement shows that they are likely to be a "melting pot" between traditionalists and modernists. Likewise with the formalist and essentialist category. Indeed, PKS and HTI's movement pattern is more associated with accommodationist and confrontational revivalist Muslim.

Furthermore, the involvement of revivalists in politics lately seemed to increase, and it confirms that the notion of view that between Islam and politics and the state cannot be separated.[]

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