

ONE ISLAMIC CULTURE, ONE POLITICAL SYSTEM, TWO FACES OF ISLAMIC POLITICS IN MADURA

A. Bakir Ihsan | UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta – Indonesia

Email: a.bakir.ihsan@uinjkt.ac.id

Abstract: The same culture and political system do not always give birth to twin political faces. This article finds that there are different policy formulations from the same cultural background and political system. Through a comparative study in two regencies, Sumenep and Pamekasan, in Madura, East Java, this article presents the results of qualitative research which shows that the existence of the same religious culture and the same political system gave birth to different Islamic political policies. There is a tendency to formalize Islam in one area (Pamekasan) and strengthen the substantive side of Islamic teachings in another area (Sumenep). Cultural similarities that are based on values, beliefs, and orientations as the dominant factors that influence political behavior, as well as the similarity of the system that places democratic mechanisms as a determinant factor for the birth of political output, have resulted in different policy formulations.

Keywords: Political culture, political system, civil society, political parties, religious policy, exclusion, moderation.

Introduction

Political culture is a pattern of orientation, values, and attitudes that are reflected in the political behavior of citizens and have an impact on the political system. A study conducted by of Robert D. Putnam¹ shows the strength of culture as a determining factor for the success or failure of democracy. Based on his studies, in one country, Italy, different political systems can be born because of different political cultures. A more classic study was presented by Gabriel A.

¹ Robert D. Putnam,, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions In Modern Italy* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993).

Almond and Sidney Verba² who explained three kinds of political culture, namely parochial, subject, and participant based on a survey in five countries with all its typological diversity. The influence of political culture on the political system as the dependent variable shows its significance.

Indonesia is a country whose citizens are very diverse, both ethnically, culturally, linguistically, and religiously. There are more than a thousand tribes and ethnic groups with all their diversity in Indonesia.³ Religion wise, although the majority are Muslims, but in Islam itself there are groups or sects that have differences which often influence political behavior.

For certain ethnic groups, such as the Madurese, several studies have showed that there is a diversity of perspectives in placing Madura as an ethnic group with all its stereotypes. So far, the Madurese are considered as a religious society or in the category of *santri* in Clifford Geertz's typology.⁴ In addition, Madurese have temperamental character and tends to resort to violence.⁵ The Madurese community with an agrarian background forms an individual-centred and makes *keiai* (religious leaders) as their communal leaders,⁶ but there is also the role of *blater* (local strongmen) and political elites as factors of influence on the other side. The Madurese have a high work ethic, but also have self-respect that can be at stake as a matter of life and death.⁷ Although there is a differentiation of roles according to their respective fields, culturally, especially in the context of understanding Islam, the Madurese community is centred on three institutions of traditionalist Islam in Indonesia; *pesantren* (Islamic traditionalist boarding schools), *keiai* (local Muslim clerics who lead *pesantren*), and Nahdlatul Ulama or

² Gabriel A. Almond & Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture, Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (California: SAGE Publications, 1989).

³ Evi Arifin and Aris Ananta, "Three Mega-Demographic Trends in Indonesia," *Social Development Issues*, 35 (2013): pp. 109–24.

⁴ Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 121.

⁵ Huub de Jonge, *Garam, Kekerasan, dan Aduan Sapi; Esai-Esai Tentang Orang Madura dan Kebudayaan Madura*, ed. by Ahmala Arifin (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2011), p. 202.

⁶ Kuntowijoyo, *Perubahan Sosial Dalam Masyarakat Agraris Madura* (Yogyakarta: Mata Bangsa, 2002).

⁷ A. Latief Wiyata, *Mencari Madura* (Jakarta: Bidik-Phronesis Publishing, 2013).

NU (an Islamic organization of traditionalist Muslims). Thus, being Muslims for Madurese means being NU with total adherence to *kiai* of *pesantren*.⁸

These studies show the diversity of viewpoints about Madurese people by looking at the differentiation of roles. However, in the context of understanding Islam in general it leads to homogenization; their strong affiliation to NU. However, if NU is placed as the cultural basis of the Madurese community which influences their political behavior, then the thesis of culture as a determinant of political behavior (democracy) does not occur. With the same culture and even the same political system, it gives birth to political behavior in the form of different public policies. This is what underlies the analysis of this article, namely to examine the factors that cause differences in political behavior in the two regencies in Madura; Pamekasan and Sumenep.

The political culture approach is an entry point for measuring individual values, beliefs, and orientations in responding to political issues. The analysis in this study is based on literature review and in-depth interviews with several representative and competent sources. The method used in this study is a qualitative method⁹ by analyzing the socio-political dynamics of religion in two regencies, namely Sumenep and Pamekasan as a basis for comparison to then be drawn conclusions. Comparative analysis in this study was carried out by looking at the similarity of backgrounds of social organizations as the cultural basis of society, namely NU. In addition, the factor of an open political system is a consideration for the possible influence on the birth of the same policy. This step is taken to obtain in-depth and comprehensive data with a scientifically justifiable level of validity.¹⁰

From this analysis, it will be seen that the trend of political behavior patterns in the two districts goes through two categorizations, namely the legalistic-formalistic and legalistic-substantive tendencies. Legalistic-formalistic refers to the formalization of Islamic teachings in the public sphere through laws or regulations. While legalistic-

⁸ Yanwar Pribadi, *Islam, State and Society in Indonesia, Local Politics in Madura* (New York: Routledge, 2018). Read also, Yanuar Pribadi, "Religious Networks in Madura: Pesantren, Nahdlatul Ulama, and Kiai as the Core of Santri Culture," *Al-Jami'ah*, 51, 1 (2013), pp. 1-32.

⁹ Patricia Leavy, *The Oxford Handbook of Qualitative Research*, ed. by Peter E. Nathan (New York: Oxford University-Press, 2014), p. 99.

¹⁰ John W. Creswell, *Research Design* (Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2014), p. 231.

substantive refers to philosophical values in regulations or policies that regulate life in general without symbolizing a particular identity.

Two Cities, One Culture; Social and Religious Portrait of the Madurese Community

The Madurese are known as very religious people. Almost every household has *langghar surau* (prayer room).¹¹ Religious commitment is also shown by their strong aspiration to perform *hajj* pilgrimage to Holy Land of Mecca. For Madurese, *hajj* is not just an ordinary worship that that spiritually can improve level of intimacy with God, but also raise their social status. Becoming a *hajj* (a person who has perform *hajj*) is a dream and a strong desire of the Madurese, thus encouraging them to make all-out economic and financial efforts to be able to perform the pilgrimage.

Madurese religious attitudes are expressed in strong emotional bonds. The religious fanaticism of the Madurese community is very strong when measured by the spirit and "sense of belonging" to religion. The sense of belonging in the view of Erich Fromm¹² is a form of effort to fulfill emotional satisfaction without requiring an interrelated evidentiary process. The religious feeling of the Madurese community is very strong from the aspect of social identity.¹³

This religious portrait is a form of acculturation of Islamic teachings who came to Madura dealing with a harsh, temperamental culture. A tough and temperamental attitude arises when self-esteem and beliefs feel harassed or humiliated by others. Not only in terms of religion, family issues and various aspects related to self-esteem, Madurese people can risk their lives.¹⁴

In general, the acculturation of Islam in the culture of the Madurese community is almost the same as that which occurs in Indonesian society.¹⁵ The form of Islamic penetration is relatively more accommodating to local culture, which is the feature that has been practiced since the coming of Islam to archipelago by

¹¹ Mohsi, "Langghar, Kophung, dan Bhaqaf," *Sabda*, 14, 1 (2019), pp. 14–20.

¹² Erich Fromm, *To Have or To Be?* (New York: Continuum, 2008).

¹³ Pribadi, *Islam, State and Society in Indonesia, Local Politics in Madura*.

¹⁴ Wiyata, *Mencari Madura*.

¹⁵ Pribadi, 'Religious Networks in Madura: Pesantren, Nahdlatul Ulama, and Kiai as the Core of Santri Culture'.

traditionalist Muslims. Now, this feature is maintained by NU through *kiais* and their *pesantren*. This is what unites the religious attitudes of the general public in two districts in Madura, Pamekasan and Sumenep, namely NU's religious beliefs and rituals. So the statement emerged that the religion of the Madurese was NU.

The Political Face of NU in Madura

So far, NU is known as an inclusive, moderate, and accommodating Islamic community organization. NU's respect for tradition is a way of *da'wah* (propagation), like the Wali Songo (the nine saints), who spread Islam in a pluralistic Indonesia in the 15th and 16th Century CE. That's why NU can be present in various places, including among minorities. One of the substantial steps of NU's appreciation for minorities was represented by Abdurrahman Wahid, the NU chairman from 1984-1999. When serving as President of Indonesia (1999-2001) he issued a policy that opened up space for the Chinese minority group and recognized Confucianism as one of the religions in Indonesia.¹⁶ Because of that, many minority groups have good relationship with NU because they appreciate the socio-cultural diversity that exists in society.

However, if the criteria of inclusive, moderate, and tolerant NU are pinned on the Madurese community as NU congregations (*nahdliyyin*) as a whole, especially in the political context, it does not seem to have a completely fit the description. By placing the tendency to involve religion in public affairs as an indicator that narrows the plural public sphere, then the emergence of differences in political behavior (expression) among *nahdliyyin* in Madura indicates a split in political attitudes. This split in political choices gives rise to groups that are considered Islamist and nationalist groups, for example in the case of the 2019 presidential election. However, this can be considered anomaly compared to the overall tendency which show the homogeneity of Madurese political choices with majority support for one particular candidate.¹⁷ Therefore, this article focuses on public policy as an output of measurable political behavior by examining the

¹⁶ Ali Mustajab, "Kebijakan Politik Gus Dur Terhadap China Tionghoa di Indonesia," *In Right*, 5 (2015): pp. 155–192.

¹⁷ Ahmad Najib Burhani, "Lessons from Madura: NU, Conservatism and the 2019 Presidential Election," *Perspective*, 72 (2019).

differences in local regulations in two regencies in Madura, Pamekasan and Sumenep, where the majority of the population are *nabdhliyyin*.

In Pamekasan regency, there is a spirit that was built as the basis for the birth of sharia regional regulations, namely the spirit of the Gerbang Salam (Gerakan Pembangunan Masyarakat Islami or Islamic Community Development Movement). Based on this spirit, from 2001 to 2019, 10 (ten) regional regulations and 2 (two) regent regulations/decisions were issued. The 10 (ten) regional regulations are Regional Regulation number 18 of 2001 on the prohibition of alcoholic drinks, Regional Regulation number 18 of 2004 on the prohibition of prostitution, Regional Regulation number 7 of 2008 on the management of zakat, infaq and alms, Regional Regulation number 5 of 2010 on operational grants for organizing the hajj, Regional Regulation number 4 of 2014 on al-Quran recitation skills for Muslim students, Regional Regulation number 5 of 2014 on controlling activities in the month of Ramadan, Regional Regulation Number 14 of 2014 on Management of Hotels, Lodgings and Boarding Houses, Regional Regulation Number 1 of 2017 on the Implementation of Social Order, Regional Regulation Number 3 of 2017 on the Implementation of Madrasah Diniyah (informal Islamic schools), Regional Regulation Number 3 of 2015 on the Implementation of Entertainment and Recreation as well as Regent's Regulation Number 14 of 2016 on the Implementation of Karaoke Entertainment Businesses and Regent's Decree Number 300 of 2009 on the Determination of Gerbang Salam as a Da'wah Model and Strategy.¹⁸

While in Sumenep, although there are similar regulations, they are not as many as in Pamekasan. Until 2019 there were 2 (two) regulations in Sumenep related to provisions in Islam, namely Regent Regulation Number 15 of 2016 concerning Mandatory enrollment of madrasah diniyah dated July 16, 2016, and Regent Regulation Number 188 of 2016 concerning Local Content in curriculum for Reciting and Writing Al-Quran (BTQ) dated 18 July 2016. This regulation received a reaction from the *nabdhliyyin* themselves because it was considered interference by the state toward the realization of Islamic teachings, bearing in mind that Indonesia was not an Islamic state. Even if it is

¹⁸ Agung Ali Fahmi, Muwaffiq Jufri, Ansori, "Bentuk Penerapan dan/atau Penyerapan Hukum Islam dalam Produk Hukum Daerah di Madura," 1, 1 (2019): pp. 552–64.

related to Islam, the Regional Regulations and Regional Regulations in Sumenep are more substantive in many respects.¹⁹

Table 1. Number of Islamic Regional Regulations in Pamekasan and Sumenep Regencies up to 2019

Regency names	Period	Number of Regional Regulation	Number of Islamic Regulations	%
Pamekasan	2008-2019	116	10	9
Sumenep	2000-2019	226	2	1

Source: Processed from the Documentation and Legal Information Network of Pamekasan Regency and Sumenep Regency, 2023, and Fahmi, Jufri, Ansori, 2019.

Culturally, there is uniformity of population in two areas (Sumenep and Pamekasan). They are the majority of *nahdliyyin* and respect for the *kiai* is very strong.²⁰ They are mostly *santri* with political choices that are not much different, namely political parties that have a historical and NU mass base, such as the United Development Party (PPP) and the National Awakening Party (PKB). In terms of Islamic educational institutions, the two districts have relatively the same number of *pesantren*,²¹ but in terms of political behavior (expression) they are different. This fact strengthens the thesis that the Madurese community, which is predominantly *nahdliyyin*, culturally tends to be homogeneous,²² but politically tends to be heterogeneous.²³

¹⁹ Fahmi, et al. See The Legal documentation and Information Network, Sumenep Regency, <https://jdih.sumenepkab.go.id/peraturan/undang-undang>, accessed on 1 October 2023.

²⁰ Pribadi, 'Religious Networks in Madura: Pesantren, Nahdlatul Ulama, and Kiai as the Core of Santri Culture'

²¹ Kementerian Agama Jawa Timur, "Data Umum Pondok Pesantren dan Madrasah Diniyah Tahun 2013," accessed from <https://jatim.kemenag.go.id/file/file/data/xloq1395925488.pdf>.

²² Abd. A'la, Muktafi Muktafi, Abu Bakar, Mukhammad Zamzami, and Ahmad Fathan Aniq. 2021. "Islamism Denounced: Madura Kiais' Perspective of Nationalism," *Karsa Journal of Social and Islamic Culture* 29, 2 (2021): pp. 388-414.

²³ M. Fauzi, "Sistem Kepartaian di Madura Pasca Reformasi", *Jurnal Adhyasta Pemilu*, 5, 2 (2022): pp. 85-99.

Religious Politics; between Exclusion and Moderation

Some of the facts above explain that culturally the Madurese community has a close relationship with NU and politically has a tendency to choose political parties that have a mass base and/or Islamic principles. These cultural and political factors have formed two typologies of political behavior, namely exclusion and moderation. Both typologies are measured by the choice of political parties and policies issued by regional heads, namely political parties and policies that are identical with Islamic identity. The choice of political parties and regional head policies is the estuary of citizen involvement in direct political contestation. Although there is a tendency towards elitism, in a democratic political system the emergence of elites cannot be separated from the choices made by individuals as citizens. This is a consequence of the existence of an open space that allows the participation of all citizens in politics.

The ongoing reform era has changed the face of power politics in Sumenep and Pamekasan Regencies. During the New Order era, the leadership in the two districts was held by bureaucrats who in fact were *priyayi*. Since the reformation in 1998, the election of regional head and representatives has provided a wider space for public expression in the context of political choices. With the freedom that the community has and the cultural identity that has long been embedded in them, they can choose leadership in accordance to their aspirations. This is evidenced by the emergence of leadership at the local level (Sumenep and Pamekasan) with a *santri* background.²⁴

The success of the *santri* in leading the region cannot be separated from, at least, three factors. First, there are political parties that channel the political aspiration of *santri*, such as PKB and PPP, the main political vehicle of the *keiai* and NU.²⁵ Second, there are *santri* resources that are able to attract people to vote for them because they are considered to have the capacity and capability as well as integrity in leadership. Third, there is the support of the *keiai*, who in the socio-cultural context of the Madurese community becomes a patron who is

²⁴ Abdul Gaffar Karim, "The Pesantren-Based Ruling Elite in Sumenep in The Post-New Order Indonesia", *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 3, 1 (2009), pp. 97-121.

²⁵ Edi Kusmayadi, Subhan Agung dan M. Ali Andrias, "Model Kepemimpinan Politik Kyai: Studi Peran Kyai dalam Pergeseran Perilaku Politik Massa NU PKB dan PPP," *Jurnal Politika* 7, 2 (2016), pp. 21-33

strong enough to mobilize the votes. Both in Sumenep regency and Pamekasan regency until 2019, the elected regents were the *santri*.

Although they have similarities in the context of socio-cultural identity as *santri*, in terms of policies, the two regencies (Sumenep and Pamekasan) have different tendencies. In Sumenep the policies that symbolize Islam are not as strong as the policies implemented in Pamekasan. If it is related to the policy moderation framework, Sumenep tends to be more moderate than Pamekasan, which is socio-culturally based on the same basis where the majority of population are *nabdhliyyin* who vote for Islamic parties of PPP and PKB.

Several policies in the form of regional regulations that are supposed to be for the benefit of the general public, regardless of their religious identity, are loaded with Islamic values and symbols. One example of a regional regulation regarding promotion requirements is related to the ability to recite the Qur'an. For some people it is considered a necessity as a form of religious commitment. Meanwhile, in the context of improving the quality of public services as part of an important function of the bureaucracy that serves all citizens of various religions, the requirements needed are professionalism, capability, and measurable integrity. This is where the relationship between religion and the state can be enforced by ensuring respect for the private and public spheres that synergize with each other without symbolization and formalization.²⁶

The formalization of Islam in the public sphere through policies made by local governments in Pamekasan is a political consequence that accommodates the aspirations and support of various existing powers. Political power can be in the form of organizations or individuals who have a strong influence as political actors. Support from Islamic organizations such as NU is inseparable from the perspective on the urgency of Islamic teachings in public life through various domains, including the state (structural) realm. Through state policies (Perda or bylaw), people can be "forced" to comply with all formal sanctions. Regulations issued by the government for certain social identity groups, such as Muslims, are included in the exclusive category, because the essence of the regulations is not symbolically limited by a particular identity. Regulations are for the general public.

²⁶ Jose Casanova, *Public Religion in the Modern World*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994).

In Sumenep Regency, regulations that formalize Islamic teachings also exist, but in small numbers, such as Sumenep Regency Regional Regulation number 11 of 2013 concerning free copies of mushaf al-Qur'an for students of basic education units. In general, the existing regulations in Sumenep Regency regulate social issues in general without the symbolization of Islam.²⁷ Thus, political expression in the context of policy in Sumenep district is relatively moderate. This is different from Pamekasan Regency which is stronger in its symbolic aspect through a policy called the Gerbang Salam, a policy that broadly facilitates the interests of Muslims through the formalization of Islamic teachings in the form of regional regulations and regent regulations.

The emergence of differences in Islamic political expression in these two regencies albeit the same religious cultural background (NU) is due to various factors. In addition to the similarity of interests, it is also due to the existence of agents who bridge the aspirations of the people and the interests of the government. These agents are organizations or individuals who are influential with all their interests.²⁸ In the case of Pamekasan Regency, these agents are played by *kiai* who come from *pesantren* and organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah and are facilitated by the government, in this case the Regent of Pamekasan. Departing from the views of religious leaders and government interests who view the need for safeguarding public morality, a collective movement was put forward by creating an institution called LP2SI (Lembaga Pengkajian dan Penerapan Syariat Islam or the Institute for the Study and Application of Islamic Shari'a). Through the Decree of the Regent of Pamekasan Number: 188/126/441.012/2002, this institution became a node of the interests of the *kiai* (ulama) and the government (umara) in managing public life through the application of Islamic law.²⁹

Meanwhile in Sumenep there are similar agents, namely *kiais* of *pesantren* and Islamic organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah and regents with *santri* backgrounds. However, this commonality of

²⁷ Bagian Hukum Sekretariat Daerah, "Peraturan Daerah", accessed from <https://jdih.sumenepkab.go.id/peraturan/undang-undang>, accessed on 20 November 2023.

²⁸ Asimina Christoforou, "Social Capital and Civil Society in Public Policy, Social Change, and Welfare," *Journal of Economic Issues* 56, 2 (2022), pp. 326-334

²⁹ LP2SI, *Mengenal Gerbang Salam* (Pamekasan: LP2SI, 2010).

agents did not lead to the formation of a collective movement that encouraged the formalization of Islam in the form of bylaws. In some cases, the Sumenep NU functionaries even rejected efforts to formalize Islamic teachings into local regulations because they were considered an attempt to homogenize and at the same time pose a threat to diversity. In addition, strengthening Islamic values or teachings has become the enduring agenda of *pesantren* and *kiai* in the community without state intervention. Mosques, *langghar*, and *pengajian* (Islamic study) groups that live in the community become the center of strengthening the community's Islamic understanding.³⁰

The different perspectives between agents (*kiai*, *pesantren*, and Islamic community organizations) in Pamekasan and Sumenep regencies in placing Islamic teachings in the public sphere have an impact on different agendas in dealing with the state (local government). This fact emphasizes the urgency of the agent's role in influencing the formulation of regional policies or regulations. Although policy is the domain of the state, support from the community is an important factor through agents that function as a bridge between the community and the state. At this point, agency is not synonymous with individual power, but part of the cultural process and an active element of culture. Agency as a cultural phenomenon.³¹ Solidity of agents as a social force also determines the level of government response. But on the other hand, the state with all its interests and authorities has an accommodative, aggregative role, not infrequently also repressive and controlling the developing aspirations,³² including those from political parties. From this, it is read that there are four forces that determine the formulation of legislation according to the level of influence they have, namely social power, individual power, political parties, and the government.

In the context of Pamekasan, the existence of Islamic parties, such as PPP, as the party with the most seats in the Pamekasan DPRD which is associated with social organizations such as NU, especially

³⁰ Dardiri Zubairi, "Interview," September 18, 2019.

³¹ Carl Ratner, "Agency and Culture", *Journal for The Theory of Social Behavior* 30, 4 (2000), pp. 413-434.

³² Syaifudin Zuhri, "Regimented Islamophobia: Islam, State, and Governmentality in Indonesia", *Qudus International Journal of Islamic Studies (QIJIS)* 9, 2 (2021): pp. 387-442.

those with the background of Sarekat Islam³³ as well as groups with other Islamic formalism orientations become a strategic force through strategic issues, namely Islamic solutions to social problems. So that political parties that have no ideological affiliation with Islam, are united by interests to get incentives from elite agreements.

The pattern of religious understanding that emphasizes the legal-formal aspects as happened in Pamekasan Regency cannot be separated from the role of *kiai* with all their backgrounds. Although the majority have NU backgrounds, they also have a long history of contact with organizations that have a tendency to formalize Islam, such as Sarekat Islam.³⁴ Even if we trace the political history of Islamic organizations at the beginning of independence, we can clearly see the traces of their efforts in fighting for the formalization of Islam into ideology and the opening of the constitution, known as the Jakarta Charter.

The level of public acceptance of organizations such as the Sarekat Islam and similar Islamic organizations indicates the compounding of aspirations in placing Islamic teachings in the public sphere. The *kiai's* affiliation and support for certain political parties also indicates a closeness that influences the behavior and political choices of the *santri*. The meeting point between the religious elite and the political elite can be a significant force in formulating policies based on common "interests" and supported by existing political forces. This is what led Pamekasan district to give birth to the Gerbang Salam slogan as an effort to ward off the moral decadence of its citizens' lives. This did not happen in Sumenep.

The role of the elite is very decisive for policy making, including the formalization of Islam in legislation if it gets the support of other elites. This was acknowledged by KH. Hamid Ali Munir, the Chairman of the DPRD (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah or local legislative assembly) Sumenep.,³⁵ Munir, who himself is a *kiai* further stated that although Sumenep is known as a relatively safe region and promotes

³³ Agus Purnomo, "Politik Hukum Elite Politik Kabupaten Pamekasan Tentang Perda Syari'at," *Istinbath*, 13 (2014): p. 1-19. Agus Purnomo, *Islam Madura Era Reformasi Konstruksi Sosial Elite Politik tentang Perda Syariat* (Ponorogo: STAIN Po Press, 2014), p. 131.

³⁴ RE Elson, "Islam, Islamism, the Nation and the Early Indonesian Nationalist Movement", *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 1, 2 (2007): pp. 231-266.

³⁵ KH Hamid Ali Munir, "Interview," September 4, 2019.

tolerance, in certain (past) leadership, there was a tendency to try to make Islam a formal rule or value that is applied in the pluralistic society of Sumenep. However, this desire was not welcomed because it did not get strong support from the existing social elite.

Admittedly, the desire to issue bylaws with sharia nuances exists and grows in Sumenep, especially since the Pamekasan district made the Gerbang Salam (Gate Salam) program. This is the impact of geographical proximity and demographic similarities in society, namely the growth of the same desire because they feel they have the same background. However, this did not materialize because there was no collective support for the political elite and the community elite in Sumenep. In response to these aspirations, the DPRD of Sumenep continued to adhere to the corridor of regulations that prioritized substance, so that it could be accepted by all groups without discrimination of religion or other identities.³⁶

The role of the elite is very decisive for the birth of a policy, so that aspirations towards the formalization of Islam into policies in Sumenep tend not to occur. The social elite, which includes religious leaders or Islamic organization figures, does not prioritize legalistic-formalistic aspects. On the other hand, Islamic values can be present in various regulations without having to be symbolized as Islamic regulations. This was acknowledged by the Chairperson of the Sumenep Regency Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), KH Syafraji, who himself is a kiai, stated that the formalization of Islam in the public sphere could further create social barriers and could disrupt social relations.³⁷ He further said that Islamic teachings can be implemented without having to be formalized in the form of government regulations. Efforts towards maximizing the application of Islamic teachings in society require the cooperation of all parties, namely the *ulama*, *umara* (government), as part of a cultural movement, not a structural one. The rules made by the government to regulate the good life of the community, not only Muslims, automatically strengthen Islamic values, without having to symbolize Islamic teachings.³⁸ The social order built by the government is an inseparable

³⁶ KH Hamid Ali Munir, "Interview."

³⁷ KH Syafraji, "Interview," September 5, 2019.

³⁸ Agung Ali Fahmi, et al., "The Implementation of Islamic Value Absorption in Regional Regulations in Madura Regency," *Al-Ihkam: Jurnal Hukum dan Pranata Sosial* 15, 1 (2020), pp. 153-172

part of the development of Muslims, without having to prioritize Islamic symbols. Without symbolization, it can embrace and protect society as a whole without distinguishing religion and other social identities.³⁹ The response given by the political elite and religious elite in Sumenep to rebuff the aspirations of symbolizing Islam is quite effective. It opens a wider space for the presence of local regulations for the benefit of the community in general, not based on certain social identities. This is different from the response given by Islamic organizations, *kiai*, politicians, and the district government in Pamekasan. They responded to the aspirations by establishing LP2SI, a research body to prepare formalization of Islamic teaching..

It is increasingly clear that there is a common spirit to apply Islamic teachings in the public sphere with different responses. In Sumenep Regency, although the aspiration to formalize Islam appeared in local legislative assembly, it did not get a strong and positive response, so it did not develop and gained very limited support. The policy emphasis on the substance of Islamic values in Sumenep Regency is intended to avoid the possibility of conflicting with higher laws which are usually general in nature. Therefore, KH Abuya Busyro Karim, the Regent of Sumenep (2010-2021) who is also *kiai* of *pesantren* and the chairman of DPRD of Sumenep (1999-2009) reminded the regent of Pamekasan not to get caught up in the symbolism of Islam in the regional regulations he made.⁴⁰

Meanwhile, in Pamekasan Regency, the aspirations of sharia regulations is seen as a solution to the problem of public morality are directly proportional to the views of various existing elements, both from political parties, Islamic organizations, *kiai*, and from the government. This similarity is an easy way for regulations that are directly related to Islamic law to emerge. Even in the view of the Chairman of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) of Pamekasan Regency, Islamic teachings must be a guide for community and policies issued by the government must be under the control of ulama. He further stated that progress and blessings in people's lives can only be achieved by enforcing Islamic-based rules.⁴¹

³⁹ KH Syafraji, "Interview."

⁴⁰ KH Abuya Busyro Karim, "Interview," September 4, 2019.

⁴¹ KH Ali Rahbini, "Interview," September 9, 2019.

Therefore, role of the elite is determinant in shaping the policy, especially in a society whose culture is still paternalistic. Relations between elites, whether in religious matters, such as *kiai*, or in political contexts such as politicians or regents, are very legitimate and decisive collaborations in determining the direction and formulation of a policy as happened in Pamekasan Regency. The meeting point of interests between religious and political elites is an easy way for the birth of a policy. Then where is the position of cultural variables in the policy formation process?

In the context of political culture, the explanation of the strategic role of the religious elite still leaves questions. For example, where does the behavior of the elites come from to reach common ground in determining policies that are based on or not based on Islam? What values, orientations, understandings, and beliefs lead to similarities on the one hand, namely the meeting point between religious elites and political elites and differences on the other, namely between the formalistic policies in Pamekasan Regency and substantive in Sumenep Regency?

This is where the political culture paradigm explores more deeply the changes in different systems within one culture. There are at least three factors that cause differences in political behavior from cultures that tend to be homogeneous. First, there are differences in perception in placing Islamic teachings in the public sphere. This perception arises from the process of education and internalization of values that develop in society over a certain period of time. Second, socio-historically, Islam with the NU tradition as the majority in Pamekasan developed through large *pesantren* which have long been associated with political organizations or parties with their distinctive Islamic style. This is inseparable from the influence of the establishment of NU in Pamekasan and the *pesantren* led by *kiai* who grew up from the Sarekat Islam background, so that the term NUSI emerged, namely NU whose political aspirations were legalistic-formalistic like Sarekat Islam (SI).⁴² Third, the momentum of collective interests. Values, orientations, and understandings that exist in society, especially among the elite, strengthen when there are political interests that allow their actualization. The intended political interest is the desire to use power

⁴² Abd. A'la, *Mukhammad Zamzami*, Nur Hidayat Wakhid Udin, Ahmad Fathan Aniq. "Islamism in Madura: From Religious Symbolism and Authoritarianism," *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 12, 2 (2018): pp. 159–194.

to accommodate general or mainstream tendencies that arise in society through policies that contain Islam.⁴³ Momentum can be created, but it can also come simultaneously due to an accidental meeting between various interests. It could be that the initial interests are not the same, but then they can synergize and support and strengthen each other when dealing with forces that are considered threatening, in this case the moral problem in society.

Support or initiation of the use of Islamic symbols in the public sphere by interest groups is intertwined with the strengthening of various Islamic expressions that emerged in the reform era. This can be seen from the views of the elite of Islamic organizations, including the Chairman PCNU (Pengurus Cabang Nahdlatul Ulama or executive branch of Nahdlatul Ulama) of Pamekasan Regency who in the previous period not only supported, but became one of the declarators of the Gerbang Salam. Meanwhile, the subsequent chairperson of the PCNU of Pamekasan Regency emphasizes the urgency of inserting the substance of Islam in regulations and the consistency of their application.⁴⁴ The potential of confidence loss in the importance of sharia-based regional regulations takes place when they are cannot implemented effectively. For example, the Gerbang Salam in Pamekasan which until now has not produced the expected results so that it seems to be limited to jargon without any meaning.⁴⁵ Efforts to ensure the effectiveness of policies through strengthening the substance is what was built in Sumenep regency. The persistence of policies that emphasize the substance aspect can not only ensure the program runs, but also automatically closes the space for egocentrism on behalf of certain groups or interests, so that it is easily accepted by the community. That is why when there is a policy that leads to certain interests, it gets protests. This can be seen from the Sumenep regency policy regarding the ability to recite al-Qur'an for students who will continue education. This policy does not run optimally because apart from being exclusive for Muslims, it is also realized that it is the authority of schools and Muslim community at large, not the regency.

⁴³ Moh Rofie, Chusnul Mar'iyah, Ma'mun Murod, "Involvement of Local Strong People in the 2018 Pamekasan Regional Election," *Journal of Social Sciences and Education (JISIP)* 7, 4 (2023): pp. 3049-3063.

⁴⁴ KH Taufiq Hasyim, "Interview," September 3, 2019.

⁴⁵ Erie Haryanto, "Gerbang Salam: Telaah Atas Pelaksanaanya di Kabupaten Pamekasan," *Karsa*, 15, 1 (2009), p. 81.

In the Madurese community, reciting the Qur'an is a cultural area that is deeply rooted and continues to be maintained by community organizations and educational institutions, so it does not require any legal enforcement of the state or government. In certain activities, people usually recite al-Qur'an as act of devotion to God and to get blessing.⁴⁶ This fact shows that the people of Sumenep have a more substantive perspective in viewing government policies related to activities with religious nuances. This is different from what happened in Pamekasan regency, where almost all elements in society, from community organizations, religious leaders, political elites, and others fully support Gerbang Salam which is strengthened through sharia-based regulations. Even recently, LP2SI, has become less effective because of the lack of attention and involvement of the Pamekasan district government in activities related to regional regulations.⁴⁷

The two districts, Sumenep and Pamekasan show two different portraits in placing Islam in the public sphere. Pamekasan with its Gerbang Salam explicitly places Islamic teachings as an inseparable part of a pluralistic public sphere. Meanwhile, Sumenep district does not have a specific program related to Islamic teachings as a policy. However, the two districts share the same passion for cultivating Islamic values which are understood as an obligation for the Muslim-majority community. Even though in Sumenep district there are regional regulations that specifically regulate Muslims, such as the regional regulations concerning the obligation to recite al-Qur'an and the obligation to enroll in madrasah diniyah, but this is more of a fulfillment of political promises.

In the perspective of a political culture that emphasizes moderation and tolerance, all political behavior must be based on collective interests that place all citizens as equal. Regulations that only regulate certain groups in any name, including on behalf of the majority, is a form of deviation which in its development will make the barriers between religious groups with different positions wider. In the perspective of political culture (civic culture), the emphasis on substance to expand the space for participation without a certain

⁴⁶ Agus Wedi, "Khataman Qur'an Pra-Acara Alako Gebhai Desa Grujugan, Sumenep, Media untuk Menangkal Bala' dan Memperoleh Berkah," *Hermeneutik: Jurnal Ilmu Al Qur'an dan Tafsir* 13, 2 (2019): pp. 65-75.

⁴⁷ Moh. Zahid, "Interview," August 30, 2019.

identity barrier is an absolute prerequisite for the growth of political society as well as strengthening democracy.⁴⁸ On the other hand, the agenda that still prioritizes the symbolization of certain identities is an obstacle that can slow down the pace of democratic consolidation as well as strengthen equality-based participation.

Strengthening the direction of participation as a prerequisite for progress cannot be separated from the role of all elements responsible for the appearance of political behavior in the public sphere. Among these elements are political parties that are responsible for the birth of egalitarian, capable, and accountable leaders. Likewise, the role of politicians who together with the government make and control policies, including Muslim community organizations that are in direct contact with the community is an important element that determines the strengthening of participation.⁴⁹ Likewise, the role of community leaders (*kiai*) who become role models and the basis of civic conscience, especially in education and religious understanding, has a significant role. Another element is *pesantren* which its students and alumni are spread in various professions and have a role in the extensification of their political choices. Meanwhile, academics can be the umbrella for the availability of academic texts in policy making that regulates all populations, not certain groups on behalf of the majority.

In the analysis of political culture based on the existing social capital of the people in two regencies, Sumenep and Pamekasan, it shows that there is a strong influence of various factors (complexity politics).⁵⁰ Both culture, system, elite interests, and context are important factors that influence each other. The complexity of these factors gives rise to differences in political attitudes and behavior in the two districts which culturally have the same values and in the political system have the same set of mechanisms and systems.

⁴⁸ Ryan Cox, "Democracy and Social Equality," *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy* 23, 1 (2022): pp. 86-114.

⁴⁹ Nick Martin, Sarah L. de Lange, Wouter van der Brug, "Staying Connected: Explaining Parties' Enduring Connections to civil Society", *West European Politics* 45, 7 (2022): pp. 1385-1406.

⁵⁰ Mark Abrahamson, "Correlates of Political Complexity", *American Sociological Review* 34, 5 (1969): pp. 690-701.

Conclusion

Political culture and political system are two factors that influence each other for the emergence of political behavior. However, in some cases the similarity of the two factors can give birth to different political behavior. The emergence of different patterns of policy is a consequence of the aspirations that develop in society. The birth of a policy involves many elements because it is related to the interests of the people. Regional legislative assembly are not alone in deciding policies, especially those with religious nuances.

In the case in Pamekasan Regency, the Gerbang Salam program is part of a meeting of interests between community groups who want regulations that have a religious nuance on the one hand and are intertwined with the wishes of DPRD members and the Regent on the other, as well as the social context that is the reason for the formation of sharia supporting institutions. Despite the fact that there are relatively moderate religious organizations, such as NU, its voice is minority. Moreover, NU Pamekasan tends to formalize religion compared to NU in Sumenep regency because of different historical backgrounds considering its past connection with Sarekat Islam.

The issue of citizen exclusivism arises because there are agents who provide compounds for the public interest on the one hand and private interests on the other by involving the existing political forces. This can be seen from the strengthening of Islamic formalization in Pamekasan which is driven by *kiai*, politicians, and supported by political parties. This can be seen from the strengthening of the formalization of Islam in Pamekasan, driven by *kiai*, politicians, and supported by political parties. In contrast to Sumenep, the driving force for regulations from the same elements, namely *kiai*, Islamic organizations, *pesantren*, and the government do not consider the formalization of Islamic teachings as a solution to social problems. The wide scope of regulations and embraces many interests without an identity barrier are considered by the religious and political elites in Sumenep. The steps taken are not to enliven formal Islamic-based regulations in the public sphere that can further entice differences, but to grow them in boundless awareness. []

References

- A'la, Abd. Mukhammad Zamzami, Nur Hidayat Wakhid Udin, Ahmad Fathan Aniq. "Islamism in Madura: From Religious Symbolism and Authoritarianism." *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 12, 2 (2018).
- A'la, Abd, Muktafi Muktafi, Abu Bakar, Mukhammad Zamzami, and Ahmad Fathan Aniq. 2021. "Islamism Denounced: Madura Kiais' Perspective of Nationalism". *Karsa Journal of Social and Islamic Culture* 29 (2), 388-414.
- Abrahamson, Mark. "Correlates of Political Complexity". *American Sociological Review* 34, 5 (1969).
- Almond, Gabriel A. & Sidney Verba. *The Civic Culture, Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. California: SAGE Publications, 1989.
- Arifin, Evi Nurvidya, and Aris Ananta. "Three Mega-Demographic Trends in Indonesia". *Social Development Issues* 35, 3 (2013).
- Bagian Hukum Sekretariat Daerah, "Peraturan Daerah", accessed from <https://jdih.sumenepkab.go.id/peraturan/undang-undang>, 20 November 2023.
- BPS Kabupaten Pamekasan. *Pamekasan dalam Angka 2017*. Pamekasan: BPS, 2017.
- BPS Kabupaten Sumenep. *Sumenep dalam Angka 2017*, Sumenep: BPS, 2017.
- Burhani, Ahmad Najib. 'Lessons from Madura: NU, Conservatism and the 2019 Presidential Election.' *Perspective*, 72 (2019).
- Casanova, Jose. *Public Religion in the Modern World*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994.
- Cox, Ryan. "Democracy and Social Equality". *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy* 23, 1 (2022).
- Creswell, John W. *Research Design*. Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2014.

- Christoforou, Asimina. "Social Capital and Civil Society in Public Policy, Social Change, and Welfare". *Journal of Economic Issues* 56, 2 (2022).
- Elson, RE, "Islam, Islamism, the Nation and the Early Indonesian Nationalist Movement". *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 1, 2 (2007).
- Agung Ali Fahmi, et al., "The Implementation of Islamic Value Absorption in Regional Regulations in Madura Regency". *Al-Ihkam: Jurnal Hukum dan Pranata Sosial* 15, 1 (2020)
- Fahmi, Agung Ali, Muwaffiq Jufri, Ansori Ansori. "Bentuk Penerapan dan/Atau Penyerapan Hukum Islam Dalam Produk Hukum Daerah di Madura." *Simposium Hukum Indonesia* 1, 1 (2019).
- Fromm, Erich. *To Have or To Be?*. New York: Continuum, 2008.
- Geertz, Clifford. *The Religion of Java*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976.
- Haryanto, Erie. "Gerbang Salam: Telaah Atas Pelaksanaannya di Kabupaten Pamekasan". *Karsa* 15, 1 (2009).
- Hasyim, KH Taufiq. Chairman of PCNU Pamekasan, "Interview," September 3, 2019.
- Jonge, Huub de. *Garam, Kekerasan, dan Aduan Sapi; Esai-Esai tentang Orang Madura dan Kebudayaan Madura*. Ed. by Ahmala Arifin. Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2011.
- Karim, Abdul Gaffar. "The Pesantren-Based Ruling Elite in Sumenep in The Post-New Order Indonesia". *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 3, 1 (2009).
- Karim, KH Abuya Busyro. the Regent of Sumenep (2010-2021), Chairman of the Sumenep DPRD (1999-2009), "Interview," September 4, 2019.
- Kementerian Agama Jawa Timur, "Data Umum Pondok Pesantren dan Madrasah Diniyah Tahun 2013," accessed from <https://jatim.kemenag.go.id/file/file/data/xloq1395925488.pdf>.
- KPU Kabupaten Pamekasan. *Penetapan Perolehan Kursi DPRD Kabupaten Pamekasan Pemilu 2019*, Pamekasan: KPU, 2019.

- KPU Kabupaten Sumenep. *Pengumuman Perolehan Kursi DPRD Sumenep Pemilu 2019*, 2019. Accessed December 16, 2019. <https://kpud-sumenepkab.go.id/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Pengumuman-Hasil-Penetapan-Perolehan-Kursi-Peserta-Pemilu-dan-Calon-Terpilih-Anggota-DPRD-Kab-Sumenep-Tahun-2019.pdf>.
- Kuntowijoyo. *Perubahan Sosial dalam Masyarakat Agraris Madura*. Yogyakarta: Mata Bangsa, 2002.
- Kusmayadi, Edi, Subhan Agung dan M. Ali Andrias. "Model Kepemimpinan Politik Kyai: Studi Peran Kyai dalam Pergeseran Perilaku Politik Massa NU PKB dan PPP." *Jurnal Politika* 7, 2 (2016).
- Leavy, Patricia. *The Oxford Handbook of Qualitative Research*, ed. by Peter E. Nathan. New York: Oxford University-Press, 2014.
- LP2SI. *Mengenal Gerbang Salam*. Pamekasan: LP2SI, 2010.
- Martin, Nick, Sarah L. de Lange, Wouter van der Brug. "Staying Connected: Explaining Parties' Enduring Connections to civil Society". *West European Politics* 45, 7 (2022).
- Mohsi. "Langghar, Kophung, dan Bhaqaf, Konservasi Kebudayaan Khazanah Keislaman Madura". *Sabda* 14, 2 (2019).
- Munir, KH Hamid Ali. Chairman of the Sumenep DPRD, "Interview," September 4, 2019.
- Mustajab, Ali. "Kebijakan Politik Gus Dur Terhadap China Tionghoa di Indonesia." *In Right* 5, 1 (2015).
- Maulid, Mustofa, Samsudin, Dina Marlina. "Proses Pengakuan Khonghucu Pada Masa Pemerintahan Abdurrahman Wahid (2000-2001)." *Historia Madania* 2, 1 (2018).
- Pribadi, Yanwar. *Islam, State and Society in Indonesia, Local Politics in Madura*. New York: Routledge, 2018.
- . "Religious Networks in Madura: Pesantren, Nahdlatul Ulama, and Kiai as the Core of Santri Culture". *Al-Jami'ah* 51, 1 (2013).
- Purnomo, Agus. *Islam Madura Era Reformasi, Konstruksi Sosial Elite Politik tentang Perda Syariat*, Ponorogo, STAIN Press, 2014.

- . "Politik Hukum Elite Politik Kabupaten Pamekasan Tentang Perda Syari'at". *Istinbath* 13, 1 (2014).
- Putnam, Robert D. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions In Modern Italy*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993.
- Rahbini, KH Ali. Chairman of MUI Pamekasan, "Interview," September 9, 2019.
- Ratner, Carl. "Agency and Culture". *Journal for The Theory of Social Behavior* 30, 4 (2000).
- Rofie, Moh, Chusnul Mar'iyah, Ma'mun Murod. "Involvement of Local Strong People in the 2018 Pamekasan Regional Election". *Journal of Social Sciences and Education (JISIP)* 7, 4 (2023).
- Rosyid, Moh. Fathor. "Habitus Haji Madura." Yogyakarta: UIN Sunan Kalijaga, 2017.
- Syafraji, KH. Chairman of MUI Sumenep, "Interview," September 5, 2019.
- Wedi, Agus. "Khataman Qur'an Pra-Acara Alako Gebhai Desa Grujugan, Sumenep, Media Untuk Menangkal Bala' dan Memperoleh Berkah". *Hermeneutik: Jurnal Ilmu Al Qur'an dan Tafsir* 13, 2 (2019).
- Wiyata, A. Latief. *Mencari Madura*. Jakarta: Bidik-Phronesis Publishing, 2013.
- Zahid, Moh. Chairman of LP2SI, Pamekasan, "Interview," August 30, 2019.
- Zubairi, Dardiri. Chairman of Lakpesdam PCNU Sumenep, "Interview," September 18, 2019.
- Zuhri, Syaifudin. "Regimented Islamophobia: Islam, State, and Governmentality in Indonesia". *Qudus International Journal of Islamic Studies (QIJIS)* 9, 2 (2021).