THE STATE, SHIA, AND EXCLUSIONARY POLICIES IN MAKASSAR – INDONESIA

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Abstract: This study examines the Shia minority in Makassar, South Sulawesi, who was excluded by anti-Shia groups, and received support from the local government. The exclusion of Shia in Makassar is contrary to the constitution in Indonesia which guarantees freedom of religion for all religious people, including the Shia group. The purpose of this study is to explain that the act of exclusion against the Shia group in the public sphere is against the Constitution. From this study, there is an urgency to build religious inclusivity and equality in democratic public policies. This study uses a qualitative approach with primary data collection methods conducting in-depth interviews with several competent informants in Makassar.

Keywords: Shia, anti-shia, exclusion, state policy, inclusivity.

Introduction

Indonesia as a plural country, consisting of various ethnicities and religions, must act fairly and wisely towards minority groups. The Indonesian constitution, namely the 1945 Constitution (UUD), which is the highest source of law, recognises and gives freedom to every group, including minority groups, both in terms of political freedom and freedom of religion. Article 28E paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution states that "Everyone is free to embrace a religion and worship according to his religion..." Then paragraph (2) says, "Every person has the freedom to believe in beliefs, express thoughts and attitudes, according to his conscience". The Constitution also says, "The state guarantees the freedom of each citizen to embrace their

religion and to worship according to their religion and belief" (Article 29 paragraph 2 of the 1945 Constitution).[1] Furthermore, in Law Number 39 of 1999, Article 22 paragraphs 1 and 2 reads: (1). Everyone is free to embrace their religion and to worship according to their religion and belief; (2). The state guarantees the freedom of every person to embrace their religion and to worship according to their religion and beliefs.[2]

Before the amendment to the Constitution, guarantees of religious freedom were only regulated in Article 29 paragraph (2) and were further regulated in the law. The existence of this regulation confirms that freedom of religion or belief is part of fundamental rights, which are non-derogable rights that are forum internum in nature such as voting, believing in a particular religion/belief, or forum externum in nature such as the right to worship, establish a place of worship, and so on.[3] After the 1998 reformation, the guarantee of freedom of religion caused problems, especially for followers of minority religions, such as Christianity, Confucianism, and Muslim minority streams, namely Ahmadiyah and Shia. Violations against religious minorities continue to increase. In 2010, there were 216 cases of attacks against religious minorities; in 2011, there were 244 cases and in 2012, there were 264 cases.[4] The Wahid Institute said that in 2010, there were 64 violations and 134 incidents of intolerance towards minorities groups. Whereas in 2011, it rose to 92 violations of religious freedom and 184 incidents of religious intolerance in 2011.[5]

Violations against religious minorities often result in policing. Policing religious conflict depends on three main variables, namely: structural variables, knowledge variables, and interaction variables.[6] Especially for Muslim minority groups, namely Ahmadiyah and Shia,

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[1] Majlis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sekretaris Jendral, "Undang Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia 1945 Dalam Satu Naskah" (Jakarta, n.d.).

[2] President Republic Indonesia, "Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 39 Tahun 1999 Tentang Hak Asasi Manusia" (Jakarta, 2019).

[3] The Wahid Foundation Team, *Mengikis Politik Kebencian* (Jakarta: The Wahid Foundation, 2018).

[4] Human Rights Watch, "Atas Nama Agama Pelanggaran Terhadap Minoritas Agama Di Indonesia," 2013, http://www.hrw.org..

[5] The Wahid Foundation Team, *Mengikis Politik Kebencian*.

[6] Rizal Panggabean and Ihsan Ali Fauzi, *Pemolisian Konflik Keagamaan Di Indonesia* (Jakarta: PUSAD, MPRK, UGM and The Asia Foundation, 2014).

where these two groups are considered deviant sects. The accusation of heresy against the religious group legally gets its justification in the Criminal Code (KUHP), Article 156a states, "Convicted of a maximum imprisonment of 5 years, anyone who intentionally publicly expresses feelings or commits an act: a. which is essentially hostile, abuses or desecrates a religion that is adhered to in Indonesia". On that basis, during the expulsion of the Shia group in Sampang, Madura, the leader of the Shia group, Tajul Muluk, was found guilty by the authorities for two main reasons. First, it has committed blasphemy. Second, they have committed acts of treason.[7]

Meanwhile, in the case of the Shia group in Makassar, South Sulawesi, there was exclusion from public space by the state. Starting from a Circular issued by the Governor of South Sulawesi, No. 450/0224/B.Kesejahteraan/2017 concerning "Being Alert to and Anticipating the Spread of Shias".[9] The Governor's Circular Letter was then used as the basis for the issuance of the Circular Letter. Makassar City Government No. 400/402/Kesra/IX/2019.[10] This Circular Letter has the same intent and purpose, namely to prohibit the Shia community in Makassar from carrying out the celebration of the Asyura religious ritual in public spaces. This circular letter is intended for all sub-district heads in the Makassar City. The circular letter prohibiting religious activities is then used as a tool of legitimacy, both by state institutions (government, police, and government institutions under them) as well as by organisations or groups of people who do not want the existence of Shia, to limit, hinder, or carry out persecution against the Shia community, especially related to their appearance in the event of the celebration of the *Asyura* religious holiday.

In this regard, this study attempts to discuss the exclusion of the Shia minority group by the state through political policies. Various

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[7]Rachmah Ida and Laurentius Dyson, "Konflik Sunni-Syiah Dan Dampaknya Terhadap Komunikasi Intrareligius Pada Komunitas Di Sampang-Madura," *Jurnal Masyarakat, Kebudayaan Dan Politik* 28, 1 (2015): pp. 33–49, https://doi.org/10.20473/mkp.-V28I12015.33-49..

[9] Gubernur Sulawesi Selatan, "Surat Edaran Gubernur Sulawesi Selatan: Mewaspadai Dan Mengantisipasi Penyebaran Ajaran Syi'ah" (Makassar: Pemerintah Provinsi Sulawesi Selatan: Sekretariat Daerah, 2017).

[10] Walikota Makassar, "Surat Edaran Walikota Makassar: Himbauan Mewaspadai Dan Mengantisipasi Penyebaran Syi'ah" (Makassar: Pemerintah Kota Makassar, Sekretariat Daerah Kota, 2019).

government policies show that the relationship between the state and the Shia group shifted from an inclusive relationship (accepting and living side by side) in the pre-Reform era to an exclusive or marginalised relationship. Two things are studied, first, the policy domain by examining regulations issued by the Provincial Government of South Sulawesi and Makassar City Government that are used to exclude Shia adherents. Second, the prohibition of Shiite groups from using public facilities. Therefore, this research will answer the question of why the state allows, even supports, the exclusion of the Shia minority group, both in the form of policies and in various statements intended to exclude the Shia group.

This research uses a qualitative method. Data is collected through observation and interviewing informants from several institutions such as the Coordinating Board for Supervision of Beliefs and Religions (Bakorpakem), the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI), and the Ministry of Religion to find out government policies on Shia groups. In addition, data were collected by interviewing members of pressure groups such as *Lembaga Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Islam* (LPPI), *Aliansi Nasional Anti Syiah* (ANAS) Makassar, Brigade Muslim, Lepas, FUUB, and *Laskar Rosululloh.* Furthermore, the data were gathered by interviewing Shia members and observing their activities in Makassar, including the Makassar branch of *Ikatan Jamaah Ahlul Bait Indonesia* (IJABI).

The existing studies on Shia mostly examined Shia from theological perspectives (studying its doctrines or teachings), using sociological approaches, or focusing on diversity management and relations between state and minority groups, as well as the conflict between Shia communities and other groups of societies. However, there have not been many studies that elaborate on Shia minority groups as their research subjects, as this group experiences discrimination from the government and society.

Among the studies examining this theme, there is research on the state policy of religious politicisation. The research shows the inconsistency between the Constitution as the highest legal reference and the state documents below it. The implementation of the politics of state recognition of religion is reflected in, among other things, judicial (violations) which are reflected in various regulations.[11] The

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[11] Tedi Kholiludin, *Kuasa Negara Atas Agama: Politik Pengakuan, Diskursus Agama Resmi Dan Diskriminasi Hak Sipil* (Semarang: RaSail Media Grup, 2009).

next study talks about "Minoritisation and Criminalisation of Shia Islam in Indonesia". This article offers insight that the anti-Shia attitude arises because there is a process of minoritisation of Shia communities. This minoritisation happens despite their great contribution to the Islamisation of Indonesia. There is several evidence in the Indonesian religious traditions that are heavily influenced by Shia traditions. However, this contribution is underplayed by some Muslims, so it seems that Shia does not contribute positively to the development of Islam in the country.[12] This form of minoritisation underlies various attitudes of discrimination and anti-Shia shown by religious groups in the country.

Furthermore, studies on the conflict involving Sunni and Shia that occurred in some parts of Indonesia have been conducted by previous scholars. For instance, the Sunni-Shia conflict in Sampang, Madura was studied by the Research Team from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, which then produced a comprehensive report on the conflict situation that caused Shia adherents to be driven from their homes.[13] The discrimination and violence against Shia in Sampang were also explored by other scholars; these studies found that the Shia community was structurally and politically discriminated.[14] They also gained theological and sociological judgments from other people.[15] Moreover, persecution against Shia also happened in Yogyakarta and Bondowoso. Besides, there was propaganda against Shia communities in those areas.[16]

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[12] Dicky Sofjan, "Minoritazion and Criminalization of Shia Islam in Indonesia," *Journal of South Asean and Middle Eastern Studies* (2016).

[13] Cahyo Pamungkas, *Mereka Yang Terusir: Studi Tentang Ketahanan Sosial Pengungsi Ahmadiyah Dan Syiah Di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia, 2017).

[14] Mukhsin Achmad, "The Construction of Discrimination Against the Shi'a Community in Sampang, Madura: A Religious Structural Violence Perspective," *Asy-Syir'ah: Jurnal Ilmu Syari'ah Dan Hukum* 55, 1 (2021): pp. 241–62, https://doi.org/10.14421/-ajish.v55i1.634.

[15] Saskia Schafer, "Islam in the Echo Chamber: Ahmadiyya and Shi'a Identities in Indonesian and Malaysian Online Discourses," *Asiascape: Digital Asia* (2018); Fany N.R. Hakim, "Re-Understanding Tolerance through Intrareligious Dialogue: The Discourse of Anti-Shi'ism in Indonesia," *Ulumuna* 25, 2 (2021): pp. 350–72.

[16] M. Khusna Amal, "Protecting Civil Rights amidst Rising Illiberalism in Indonesia's Democracy: State's Response to Sharia-Based Violence against Shi'a Groups," *Ulumuna* 24, 2 (2020): pp. 296–319; Al Makin, "Homogenizing Indonesian Islam: Persecution of the Shia Group in Yogyakarta," *Studia Islamika* (2017), https://doi.org/10.15-408/sdi.v24i1.3354.

In particular, a study on religion-political based exclusion is found in Beth Elise Whitaker's article, "Citizens and Foreigners: Democratisation and the Politics of Exclusion in Africa". This article discusses the political rhetoric used by political candidates in the elections in Africa, who adopt democratic rhetoric while at the same time using exclusionary strategies to marginalise their political opponents. This research focuses on strategies to disqualify political opponents using group-identical issues so that certain candidates and certain social groups are deprived of their citizenship rights, and they are marginalised in political contestation. The explicit manipulation efforts committed by ruling political parties in political contestations are a threat to the value of democracy itself. The ways of political exclusion in the form of utterances and regulations usually implemented by the authorities can marginalise individuals from political processes. Thus, this is an exclusion legitimised by the state.[17]

To understand the rules regarding the prohibition on religious activities of Shia groups in Makassar and South Sulawesi Province, this study used David Easton's Political System theory. Easton's theory explains that a policy, including in this case the prohibition on religious activities of Shia groups, emerges as the resulting conversion of inputs in the form of demands or supports from various societal elements that are systematically processed by the political system. The process involves both internal and external dynamics to produce outputs in the form of decisions or actions.[18]

Concerning religious groups, this form of exclusion occurs between majority religious groups and minority religious groups. The process of exclusion takes place in social and political spheres where minority religious groups are marginalised and excluded from political processes such as local elections and other social relations. In this case, politics of exclusion is defined as political marginalisation and neglect in the political process against people with religious interpretations different from the religious interpretations of the majority religious group.[19]

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[17] Beth Elise Whitaker, "Citizens and Foreigners: Democratization and the Politics of Exclusion in Africa, Project Muse," *African Studies Review* 48, 1 (2005): pp. 109–26.

[18] David Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1965).

[19] JG Voelkel, D Ren, and M Brandt, "Political Inclusion Reduces Political Prejudice," *PsyArXiv Journal* (2019).

Referring to Easton's theoretical assumptions, the process of any political system can be described as an input-and-output process. The whole process, from incoming inputs to resulting outputs involves a lot of related parties. What needs to be stressed is that a policy as an output is an integral part of a systemic process of inputs.[20] In this case, the inputs are community demands, aspirations, and support. These inputs are then processed into outputs in the form of policies and decision which are influenced by various dynamics in social settings.

The politics of exclusion are defined in this paper as "a state action that excludes certain groups." The term "politics of exclusion" used in this paper refers to the concept originally used in the field of economic development. The concept of exclusion was originally used to describe the process of social disintegration due to economic crises in society. As a solution, the government will make a policy to overcome the crisis. However, in practice, economic policies often do not reach all social groups. Scientists call this discrepancy exclusion.[21] In later development, this concept has been widely used, especially in development and social policy studies.

Moreover, Sen and Silver assert that exclusion is a polysemy concept (having many meanings). It is therefore widely open to redefine and apply it in different contexts. In addition, exclusion is also studied as a condition where a certain social group is marginalised or excluded from the space where they should get their rights. The concept of exclusion can also be used to explain a political process conducted by one group against certain individuals or social groups so that they lose their civil rights.[22] This theory was initially developed in the context of economic and development issues. Anthony Giddens, however, mentioned that social exclusion is a broader concept than poverty, although poverty itself is included in it.[23]

Social exclusion focuses its attention on the various factors preventing individuals or groups from having chances compared to the majority group. In this case, the majority of categories can be grouped into various aspect such as ethnicity and religion. Meanwhile, Lawang

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[20] Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (1965).

[21] Amartya Sen, *Social Exclusion: Concept, Application, And Scrutiny*, Social Dev (Manila, Philippines: Asian Development Bank, 2000).

[22] Sen; Hilary Silver and S.M Miller, "Social Exclusion: The European Approach Social Disadvantage," *Indicator* 2, 2 (2003).

[23] Anthony Giddens, *Sociology*, 5th Edition (Jakarta: Polity Press, 2006).

mentioned that social, economic, and political structures also play a role in creating forms of social exclusion in society. Likewise, social exclusion in Indonesia is also based on assumptions about the social structure in which social exclusion occurs. They suggested several hypotheses on social exclusion in Indonesia, including a suggestion that marginalised groups or the poor lead to social exclusion. This social exclusion in Indonesia can occur for several social units, such as the poor, women groups, elderly people, people living in remote and underdeveloped areas, and people with certain stigmas (like communism, drug abuse, HIV AIDS, etc.).[24]

One of the studies on religion-based exclusion is explained in Will Kymlicka's book, *Culturally Responsive Policies*. Kymlicka, as discussed by Bhargava, distinguishes religious exclusion into two categories: exclusion from religion and religion-based exclusion.[25] The first, exclusion from religion, is the process of marginalising individuals or groups from freedom and equal rights in religion. The second, religion-based exclusion is the social exclusion against certain individuals or groups in a wider context, outside the religious domain, such as the one inflicted on Ahmadiyya and Shia groups. Both are excluded, including from their civil rights, because of their religious identity. This is a religion-based exclusion. This form of exclusion occurs when a person's religion and religious identity are seen by others as reasons to exclude them from legal, economic, and political rights, which are usually accessible to members of society in general.

Regarding the Shia communities in Indonesia, they have experienced a series of form of discrimination and exclusion, either done by the society or the state as previously described. For instance, Shia in Makassar, who became the subject of this study, had been excluded from public activities and political access. The provincial and municipal governments issued regulations to limit their movements.[26] This issue will be explored more in the next part of the article.

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[24] Robert M.Z. and Lawang, "Beberapa Hipotesis Tentang Eksklusi Sosial Di Indonesia," *Jurnal Ilmu Sosial Mamangan* 2, 1 (2014).

[25] Rajeev Bhargava, *Inclusion and Exclusion in South Asia: The Role of Religion* (Human Development Report Office, 2004).

[26] Gubernur Sulawesi Selatan, "Surat Edaran Gubernur Sulawesi Selatan: Mewaspadai Dan Mengantisipasi Penyebaran Ajaran Syi'ah"; Walikota Makassar, "Surat Edaran Walikota Makassar: Himbauan Mewaspadai Dan Mengantisipasi Penyebaran Syi'ah."

Shia in Makassar

Shia entered Indonesia in the early days of the arrival of Islam in Indonesia, namely through the early propagators of Islam among Persians living in Gujarat. Shia first came to Aceh. The first king of the Samudra Pasai Kingdom located in Aceh, Marah Silu, embraced the Shiite version of Islam by using the title Malikul Saleh. The spread of Shia in Aceh was also supported by prominent religious figures, Hamzah Fansuri, and Syamsuddin bin Abdullah as Samatrani, Nuruddin ar-Raniry, Burhanuddin, and Ismail bin Abdulla. However, during the time of Sultan Iskandar Tsani, royal power in Aceh was held by the Sunni (Sunni) scholars, so since then the Shiite group has no longer appeared, choosing to preach *taqiyah*. [27] After the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, Shia became increasingly known in Indonesia and has grown rapidly to this day. [28]

There are five critical concepts that define the Shi'a community and its different groups in Indonesia today: (1) *ahl al-bait* refers to the family of the Prophet through Fatimah, the Prophet's daughter, and her husband Ali; (2) *al-ghayba al-kubra*, or the Great Occultation refers to the Twelvers' belief that the twelfth imam was hidden by God: (3) *taqiyah*, the concealment of one's true faith under circumstances of imminent threat, to avoid discrimination and persecution, especially in areas where they constitute a minority; (4) *wilayat al-faqih* or governance of jurists. The wali al-faqih has full authority to assume all religious and governmental duties, and (5) *marja' al-taqlid* or source of emulation refers to the concept in Shi'a jurisprudence that requires Muslims to emulate and follow a living interpreter of Islamic law, or mujtahid.[29.]

In terms of the current number of Shia followers in Indonesia, it is difficult to estimate, because there are no reliable officials. However, there are a number of estimates that can be cited. For example, Muhammad Andy Assegaf, Chairman of the Fatimah Foundation, a Shi'a-affiliated foundation in Jakarta, estimates that the number of Shiites is one million. In 2000, other estimates cited by local media put the number at around three million; more recently, the same source

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[27] Jalaluddin Rakhmat, *Catatan Kang Jalal: Visi Media, Politik Dan Pendidikan*, ed. Miftah F Rakhmat (Bandung: Remaja Rosdakarya, 1997).

[28] Seyyed Abolhasan Navvab, "The Shi'i Minority in Indonesia: A Consideration of Its Historical and Cultural Links and Gaps with the Sunni Majority," *Journal of Shi'a Islamic Studies* (2018), https://doi.org/10.1353/isl.2018.0010.

[29] IPAC, "The Anti-Shi'a Movement Indonesia," *IPAC Report*, April 27, 2016.

put the figure at five million. Information released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, of the United States Department of State in its 2008 International Religious Freedom Report, states that there are an estimated one million to three million Shia followers among the Sunni majority in Indonesia.[30]

The number of Shia followers can be seen from the existence of Shia organisations. As a social organisation, the Shia group is under the auspices of several mass organisations such as the Association of Jama'ah Ahlul Bait Indonesia (IJABI), a national Shia organisation founded in 2000. Jalaluddin Rakhmat, the founder of IJABI, stated that the number of Shia members is around 2.5 million throughout Indonesia (IJABI, 2009).[31] Another Shia organisation is Ahlul Bait Indonesia (ABI). This organisation was **founded** in 2010. This **organisation** was founded by Shiite followers who mostly have Arab ethnic backgrounds. One of the reasons for the establishment of ABI is the superiority of the Arab ethnic Shiites as a group that has the right to have its own Shiite organisation because they are people who have a lineage with the Prophet known as Habib.[32]

The establishment of Ikatan Jamaah Ahlul Bayt Indonesia (IJABI) is a milestone in the history of Shia in Indonesia. It is the first Shia organisation recognised by the government. IJABI was founded in July 2000, and it was declared in Gedoeng Merdeka, Bandung West Java. After the declaration, to obtain legal recognition, IJABI submitted an application for legal status to the Ministry of Home Affairs in Jakarta.

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[30] Umar Faruk Assegaf, "The Rise of Shi'ism in Contemporary Indonesia: Orientation and Affiliation" (The Australian National University, 2012), https://www.academia.-edu/34304866/.

[31] As quoted by IPAC, the figure of 2.5 million is only an estimate. This is because many IJABI members do not wish to be identified as Shia. This fact was underlined by the statement IJABI official that explained: "We don't have membership cards because many of our members do not want to be identified as Shi'a. Many have had problems with their careers when their employers found out they were Shi'a." See. IPAC, "The Anti-Shi'a Movement Indonesia."

[32] Meanwhile, according to IPAC, Shiites in Indonesia are divided into three groups: Ikatan Jamaah Ahlulbait Indonesia (IJABI); Ahlul Bait Indonesia (ABI); and Organisation of Ahlulbayt for Social Support and Education (OASE). IJABI, the largest, was established in 2000. ABI, founded in 2010 and much smaller than IJABI, is dominated by Sayyids (descendants of the Prophet) and religious scholars concerned with jurisprudence; it is more Iranian-oriented in terms of its doctrine and political stance. OASE is the smallest, with a more puritan outlook. See; IPAC.

On August 11, 2000, IJABI was officially registered *at Direktorat Jenderal Kesatuan Bangsa dan Perlindungan Masyarakat* (the Directorate General of National Unity and Community Protection), with registration number: 127 Tahun 2000 D.I 11 August 2000.[33] The immediate approval for the IJABI application and the fact that a Shia association is legally recognised are the result of political dynamics that took place during the Reformation era. The legal recognition means that IJABI became an official national Shia organisation in Indonesia, an important event in the history of Islam in the country. With this status, IJABI is legally equivalent to other mass organisations. This recognition is important in terms of their struggle against the anti-Shia escalation.[34]

The propagation of Shia in Makassar is inseparable from its development at the national level, especially the founding of IJABI, which was declared in Bandung in 2000. After its founding at the national level, several branches of IJABI were founded in other areas, including Makassar. Shia grew rapidly in Makassar during the Reformation era. This is marked, for example, by the founding of sermon and discussion communities on almost every campus. After completing their studies and returning to their hometowns, student activists who converted to Shia in Makassar became propagation agents in their own areas.[35]

However, in the context of Makassar and, more broadly, South Sulawesi province, the tension in relations between Shia, on the one hand, and Sunni groups as well as other religious organisations and the

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[33] Ken Miichi, "Minority Shi'a Groups as a Part of Civil Society in Indonesia," Middle East Institute, August 20, 2016, https://www.mei.edu/publications/minority-shia-groups-part-civil-society-indonesia; Achmad Rosidi et al., *Dinamika Syiah Di Indonesia*, ed. Ubaidilah (Jakarta: Puslitbang Bimas Agama dan Layanan Keagamaan, 2017).

[34] The term anti-Shia is conceived as the prejudice against or hatred of Shia Muslims based on their religion and heritage. The term was first defined by Shia Rights Watch in 2011. According to Shia Right Watch (SRW), the term Anti-Shi'ism must be used in regard to crimes against Shia. Anti-Shi'ism is expressed in different acts and forms including to faith when some religious groups consider the Shia to be nonbelievers (Kuffar). Anti-Shia also expressed in social relations where, in some parts of the world, Shia are treated as second-class citizens and restricted from accessing their rights in politics, education, and culture. See: Dede Syarif et.all, "Anti Shi'ism in Indonesia: Genealogy, Development, and Methods," *Harmoni* 16, 1 (2017): pp. 24–37.

[35] A.M. Safwan, "Ikatan Jamaah Ahlul Bait Indonesia (IJABI) Sebagai Gerakan Sosial Keagamaan," (2016), http://raushanfikr.tripod.com/matakul/sosio-agama.htm.

local government, on the other hand, escalated more due to the momentum of changes in the national politics after the Reformation era. This is especially related to the founding of IJABI in Makassar as a legal community organisation recognised by the central government. With this legality, Shia groups, in Makassar and in other Indonesian regions felt they had the right to appear in public spaces. It is in the context of their use of and appearance in the public space that their identity as Shia adherents, which was previously hidden (*taqiyya*) becomes easier to identify, especially during religious ceremonies such as the Ashura holiday.[36]

Furthermore, the interaction between Shia groups and other religious groups, such as the Sunni group, which consists of various religious organisations with various names, becomes more intensive. But at the same time, the tension escalates between groups. Religious groups, that identify themselves as Sunni, such as *Aliansi Nasional Anti Syiah* (the National Anti-Shia Alliance), *Lembaga Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Islam* (the Institute for Islamic Studies and Development), and MUI, are the ones that openly assert their rejection of Shia activities in the public space.[37]

The Political Dynamics of the Policy of Shia Prohibition

The South Sulawesi Provincial Government's regulation on the prohibition of Shia is issued as a result of pressure from anti-Shia groups who have long campaigned for the prohibition of Shia activities in public spaces and insisted that Shia is a heretical sect. The anti-Shia groups in South Sulawesi were represented by several groups, mainly by Eastern Indonesia Representatives of *Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam* (LPPI). This group has long made various efforts to

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[36] Sabara, "Geliat Syiah, Perubahan Paham Dan Perilaku Keagamaan Mahasiswa Muslim Di Kota Makassar," *Jurnal Harmoni* 11, 4 (2012): pp. 46–55; Sabara Nuruddin, "Eksklusi Dan Strategi Pertahanan Diri: Kasus Syiah Sebagai Liyan Di Makassar," *Mimikri* 7, 2 (2021): pp. 203–21.

[37] This anti-Shia mobilization also occurred in Bondowoso, East Java, in 2016, namely the anti-Milad Fatimah mass mobilization action carried out by IJABI. This action was carried out by Sunni militant groups from the NU, FPI, Wahabi/Salafi and HTI circles, who merged themselves into FOKUS (Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama'ah/Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama'ah Communication Forum). See more M. Khusna Ama, "Anti-Shia mass mobilization in Indonesia's democracy: godly alliance, militant groups and the politics of exclusion," *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 10, 1 (2020), pp. 25-48.

discredit sects considered different from their interpretation of Islam, including Shia. They also conducted their actions in various regions of Indonesia.[38]

Likewise, their actions in South Sulawesi were done with the aim of limiting the social space of Shia groups. They further urged the government to make policies limiting or preventing the movement of Shia adherents, especially in public spaces. Various methods have been used to attain their goal, from spreading hate speech and giving lectures discrediting Shia to submitting petition letters on the necessity of excluding Shia through formal government channels and visiting formal institutions such as the Regional Representative Council of South Sulawesi Province.[39]

On its Facebook page, LPPI describes itself as a religious institution affiliated with Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (DDII). It is explained that LPPI is committed to conducting research and study of genuine Islamic teachings to serve as a **reference** to straighten out religious deviations and make people aware of the dangers of devious sects.[40] This notion was similar to the explanation given by the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI).[41]

Based on LPPI's self-description on social media, it can be said that it is an "Islamic purification" movement relying on Wahhabi theology. This assumption is supported by its affiliation with DDII, a da'wah organisation founded in 1967 by Muhammad Natsir. DDII is also one of the main beneficiaries of Saudi aid for da'wah and Islamic activities in Indonesia. In its journey, DDII developed into a

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[38] VOA Indonesia, "Sejumlah Ulama Indonesia Gelar Deklarasi Anti Syiah," April 21, 2014, https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/sejumlah-ulama-indonesia-gelar-deklarasi-an-ti-syiah/1897507.html.

[39] "Interview with the Chairman of IJABI South Sulawesi Province" (Makassar, June 21, 2021).

[40] LPPI Makassar, "Syiah Mengancam Keutuhan NKRI," 2013, http://www.lppima-kassar.co.id/2013/03/syiah-mengancam-keutuhan-nkri.html?m=1.

[41] In The book written by the MUI Team, explains the deviations committed by the Shia group, namely: (1) deviations in understanding regarding the originality of the Al-Qur'an, (2) deviations in understanding regarding the Ahlul Bait of the Prophet Muham mad and making the Companions of the Prophet infidel; (3) deviations in ideology that disbelieve other Muslims; (4) deviations in understanding regarding the position of Shiite Imams, and (5) deviations in understanding regarding Mut'ah marriage laws. See: MUI, *Mengenal Dan Mewaspadai Penyimpangan Syi'ah Di Indonesia* (Jakarta: MUI, 2013).

conservative organisation with strong anti-Shia, anti-Christian, and anti-Ahmadiyya sentiments. The same sentiments (especially anti-Shia) also appear in LPPI's views and actions. The anti-Shia project itself is in line with Saudi Arabia's foreign agenda, which seeks to counter the Shia influence in Muslim-populated countries, especially after the Iranian Islamic revolution.[42]

DDII's ties with Saudi Arabia are clearly seen in the figure of Natsir as Indonesia's representative for Rabitah Alam Islami (World Muslim League), an international organisation based in Mecca and dedicated to strengthening Saudi Arabian cultural and ideological influence on the Muslim world through Wahhabi propaganda. Wahhabism is a religious ideology originating from the teachings of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, an 18th-century Muslim theologian from Najd, Saudi Arabia. Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab also contributed to the formation of the Saudi Kingdom on September 23, 1932, with its first king, Abdul Aziz As-Saud.[43] DDII's da'wah agenda is mostly in line with Saudi Arabia's geopolitical interests in the local context. The threat of the Iranian Revolution to Saudi Arabia's supremacy as the leader of the Islamic world forced DDII to be a stronghold of Wahhabi teachings in Indonesia. Therefore, the fact that LPPI is an extension of DDII is clearly visible in its efforts to prevent the propagation of Shia in Indonesia, as it did in the issuance of

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[42] In Saudi Arabia, which is a Sunni center, discrimination against Shiites is extraordinary. Shia Muslims in Saudi Arabia have been the victims of systematic government abuse and discrimination. Among these practices is the state-sponsored destruction of Shia places of worship and vandalism of Shia graves and mausoleums, physical attacks on Shia worshippers, particularly during Ashura celebrations. School textbooks teach that Shia Islam is not a true form of Islam and that Shia Muslims are unbelievers. The country's political system excludes Shia citizens from influential posts. See: Fred R Von der Mehden, "Saudi Religious Influence in Indonesia," 2014, https://www.mei.edu/publications/saudi-religioous-influence-indonesia; Americans for Democracy & Human Rights in Bahrain (ADHRB) and the Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy (BIRD), *Voice for the Voiceless: Religious and Cultural Discrimination in Saudi Arabia* (Northwest, Suite 205 Washington, D.C: Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy, 2017), https://www.adhrb.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/ADH-RB_Voiceless_Web.pdf.

[43] M. Mangasing, "Muhammad Ibn 'ABD Al-Wahhab Dan Gerakan Wahabi," *Hunafa: Jurnal Studia Islamika* 5, 3 (2008): pp. 319–28, https://doi.org/10.24239/jsi.v5i3.181.31-9-328.

regulations of the South Sulawesi Province and Makassar City Governments (*Pemerintah Kota Makassar*).[44]

In this case, LPPI's efforts started with making a petition, which was then responded by Commission E of the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) of the South Sulawesi Province by holding a hearing meeting (RDP) on November 2, 2016. The RDP recorded that the meeting was attended by 12 of the 17 members of Commission E. Besides the DPRD members, the meeting was also attended by the Assistant III representing the Governor of South Sulawesi, the Head of the Regional Office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs of South Sulawesi, the Head of the People's Welfare Bureau of the Regional Secretary of the South Sulawesi Province, the Head of the Board of Unity of Nation and Politics (*Bakesbangpol*) of the South Sulawesi Province, the South Sulawesi MUI represented by the chairman of the Fatwa Commission, and South Sulawesi LPPI chairman.[45]

The RDP notes stated that the meeting produced the following conclusions: (1) Commission E of DPRD expected the South Sulawesi provincial government to take monitoring measures and investigations involving the Ministry of Religious Affairs, MUI, and related parties regarding Shia doctrines that are troubling the community; (2) The Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) of South Sulawesi provides briefings to preachers and the public to anticipate against the propagation of Shia doctrines; (3) It is hoped that all components of the community will follow the guidance and supervision without committing violence against Shia; and (4) It is hoped that *Bakesbangpol* will monitor the development, the situation, and the condition of Shia propagation, and it needs to identify mass organisations adhering to Shia ideology.[46]

The RDP results, together with MUI Fatwa No. 19 for the year 1997 and the recommendations of the MUI National Work Meeting in 2014, were used as reasons for the South Sulawesi Provincial Secretariat to issue a regulation on alert and anticipate the propagation of Shia in South Sulawesi Province.

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[44] J. De Haan, "Saudi Strategies for Religious Influence and Soft Power in Indonesia. Future Directions International," 2020.

[45] "Interview with Officials at the Regional Secretariat of the South Sulawesi Provincial Government" (Makassar, June 22, 2021).

[46] "Interview with Officials at the Regional Secretariat of the South Sulawesi Provincial Government."

The regulation was actually not widely distributed, and its copies were only given to the governments of cities and regencies in South Sulawesi. This happened because, at the time, there were disagreements within the provincial government regarding the rule. This delayed the official dissemination of the rule to the public, although it was claimed that finally a copy of the rule was accidentally circulated widely because someone took a photo of it and disseminated it digitally through various social media platforms. The explanation, however, could be just an excuse to avoid accusations that the local government has violated religious freedom by distributing a copy of its rule, due to the fact that it has been officially numbered, signed, and stamped by the regional secretary of the province of South Sulawesi. So, administratively speaking, the copy of the rule is legal and issued officially by the regional government of South Sulawesi[47].

It is worth noting that, compared to the provincial rule; there was an escalation in the designation of Shia groups in the city regulations. The rule issued by the Makassar City government states that the celebration of Ashura and Shia doctrines, in general, is seen as a form of deviation, not a mere different interpretation and expression of Islam. According to the rule, practicing Shia is not included in the religious freedom protected by the state constitution. Rather, it is a blasphemy that potentially threatens societal integrity and security.[48]

Both the provincial government and the city/regency government regulations were welcomed by anti-Shia groups. The rule served as a tool used by these groups to urge official institutions such as the police, *Bakesbangpol*, and local governments not to give permission for any Shia public activities. They even used the rules to pressure owners of gathering facilities such as meeting rooms and hotels not to let Shia groups use their properties. How these efforts were conducted is shown in the following excerpt from an interview with Ustadz Z, the leader of Brigade Muslim Indonesia (BMI), an anti-Shia group:[49]

> "Every time e approach Ashura, we will remind the apparatus…we contact the apparatus… we always remind them not to let South Sulawesi be marred by the actions of heretical

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[47] "Interview with Officials at the Regional Secretariat of the South Sulawesi Provincial Government" (Makassar, July 7, 2021).

[48] "Interview with Sbr, Leader of IJABI" (Makassar, July 6, 2021).

[49] "Interview with Z, Leader of Brigade Muslim Indonesia " (Makassar, 2021).

groups. If they go (to hold religious activities), then we will also go. We monitor every place where they usually hold their activities. At that time, at the Claro Makassar Hotel, it was we who disbanded them. It's our friends who disbanded them."

The issuance of the regulations is a form of takeover of the government's role by groups that have been campaigning against Shia in society. The prohibition of Shia activities in public spaces, such as the celebration of Ashura, through regulations issued by the local government illustrates an active violation of the protection of religious freedom by the state. Such methods have been apparent since the campaign to label Shia groups as heretical to the release of rules prohibiting Shia followers from practicing their beliefs and conducting their religious activities. Another active violation is implied in the regulation issued by the Governor of South Sulawesi urging to hold the process of guidance on religious activities and supervision of heresies.[50] The rule implicitly stigmatises those who embrace Shia doctrines as heretics and therefore need to be guided.

The labeling of Shia as heretics begins with hatred; the hatred is then spread to mobilise the mass, which leads to intimidating or attacking such groups. However, in the case of Shia in South Sulawesi and Makassar, this pattern has evolved from mere discrimination through mass mobilisation to pressure involving state actors such as local governments.[51] For example, local governments in South Sulawesi are used to make official policies, such as regulations, in line with the interests of the pressure groups. Although the goal in both cases is the same, the use of state or regional government apparatus certainly has a wider impact. The ban on Shia in this area was an escalating shift from personal and group exclusion to a form of systemic exclusion through official government policies.

The rule issued by the provincial government later served as a driving factor for policies made at district and city levels. for example, issued rule No. 400/402/kesra/IX/2019,[52] and the Gowa Regency Government issued rule No. 188/144/kesbang created in September 2019, as it was in accord with the celebration of Ashura Day. This is

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[50] "Interview with ZA, Social Movement Activist" (Makassar, June 24, 2021).

[51] "Interview with Ir, LAPAR NGO Member" (Makassar, June 25, 2021).

[52] Walikota Makassar, "Surat Edaran Walikota Makassar: Himbauan Mewaspadai Dan Mengantisipasi Penyebaran Syi'ah."

evidenced by the fact, which the rules issued at district and city levels are based on the higher rule, that is at the provincial level. This domino effect clearly appears in the statement of Iqbal Suhaebi, the acting mayor of Makassar, explaining the rule urging and to guards against the propagation of Shia, released to all sub-district heads in Makassar City. According to Iqbal, the rule was issued based on provincial government rule. Afterward, a similar rule was issued by the city and distributed to sub-districts. Long before, recommendations for the ban were made by the MUI of South Sulawesi and the City of Makassar based on the central MUI Fatwa. The goal, as Iqbal explained, is to prevent some people from opposing this activity (the propagation of Shia).[53]

From the perspective of the government (the Makassar City Government), the rule was the result of a response mechanism to pressures from interest groups on the pretext of maintaining societal security and peace. So, the rule in question, on the anticipation against Shia doctrines, No. 400/402/Kesra/IX/2019 was signed by the acting Mayor of Makassar, Iqbal Suhaeb, and issued on Monday, September 9, 2019.

The Role of Local Government (State)

Political decision such as the release of rule are made through a series of processes involving state actors, not only the government apparatus, but also members of the South Sulawesi Regional Representative Council (DPRD). The DPRD members were involved, for example, in the Hearing Meeting (RDP) on the matters, which was also attended by religious organisations such as MUI and others. State actors were involved in several levels of the process that finally resulted in the regulation as a political product.

The state actors did not play the role of protectors for all diverse citizens with no exception. Instead, they became active actors in the process of exclusion of certain groups, in this case, the Shia group. Ideally, the state should act fairly in protecting all citizens in a democratic country, but in reality, it failed to perform this task, as was seen in the case of the Shia community in South Sulawesi and Makassar. Furthermore, the lack of government autonomy in South Sulawesi and Makassar was seen in how certain social groups

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[53] "Interview with Iqbal Suhaebi, the Acting Mayor of Makassar" (Makassar, 2019).

controlled them to advance their interests. Traced back to their original causes and excuses, before the rampant acts of discrimination against Shia adherents in the City of Makassar, it is worth noticing that pressures against state actors were not only exerted at the local level in South Sulawesi or Makassar. Long before, the pressure was present, for example, in the Central MUI fatwa issued in Jakarta since 1984, which took the same stance towards Shia groups.[54]

The central MUI issued a fatwa declaring that Shia has fundamentally different principles from the doctrines of Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah adhered by Indonesian Muslims. Therefore, Indonesian Muslims were advised not to be influenced by the propagation of Shia and to always protect themselves from its doctrines. In fact, MUI, as an institution defined itself as a representation of Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah School and a deliberative forum for scholars from various religious organisations. It claimed to consist of Muslim scholars who aim to protect the Indonesian Muslim ummah[55]

The MUI fatwa regarding Shia has slowly formed people's perceptions that Shia is considered a sect deviating from the main teachings of Islam. After the MUI fatwa was released, various reactions regarding Shia's existence in various regions emerged in the public, including what happened in South Sulawesi and the City of Makassar. Even today, there are still many people who think Shia doctrines deviate from the teachings of Islam based on the fatwa. It is possible that the fatwa also affects the stance of local government actors, who should be a neutral party.

If the rules are examined closely, the wording of political decisions at every level and stage is based on the religious understanding of the dominant group, something highly subjective and debatable. The designation as heretical and the issue of **blasphemy** then served as the basis for consideration by the regional government, as the state representative, to make policies. In the case of Makassar, the regional government's decision to ban Shia Muslim communities cannot be separated from the strong insistence of anti-Shia groups. Thus, the state's perspective and stance are influenced by the values living in and rooted in the traditions of anti-Shia groups. In other words, it can be

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[54] MUI, *Mengenal Dan Mewaspadai Penyimpangan Syi'ah Di Indonesia.*

[55] MUI, "Fatwa Majlis Ulama Indonesia Tentang Faham Syiah," https://www.mui.or.-id/baca/fatwa/faham-syiah.

said that the state was successfully taken over by majority religious groups through their ideological constructions.

The takeover of the role of the state is reflected at least in the success of anti-Shia groups in reproducing heresy and blasphemy discourses as an argumentative basis for making policies rejecting the existence of Shia groups and prohibiting their appearance in the public space. The discourses are used as a political solution to the problem of religious freedom based on their understanding and strengthened by pressures from groups with similar ideologies. Consequently, the local government's autonomy as servants for all citizens was successfully taken over by religious groups via anti-Shia groups.

From the previous analysis, at least the following facts support the argument that the role of the state was taken over by anti-Shia groups: (1) In the mediation process between Shia and anti-Shia groups held by the South Sulawesi Provincial Government, the Makassar City Government, and the security forces, the government officials did not position themselves in a neutral position as protectors of the community; (2) The regional government decided unilaterally to forcibly disband Shia religious ceremonies, without negotiating with Shia groups as the victims; and (3) In the case of civilians disbanding Shia ceremonies, instead of preventing the intimidation done by intolerant groups, the local government and security forces actually accelerated the disbanding process.

Thus, the rule indicates that the state government, in this case the regional government, has harmed religious freedom for Shia groups in Makassar. The rule banning Shia groups in Makassar suggested that the government protection is aimed more at particular doctrines or interpretations of religion than at its adherents and at members of the community, even though the citizens are what should be protected, not their religious beliefs, because religion is not the subject of a policy.

The fundamental problem with the rules of the South Sulawesi Governor and the Makassar City Government is the neglect of the basic rights of citizens to choose religion and worship freely. The neglect of these basic rights is completely against the Constitution, especially Article 28E. In general, the state, represented by the

regional government, serves as a tool or authority to regulate or control common problems on behalf of the community.[56]

The state should be able to make policies regarding issues of ethnicity, religion, race, and inter-group (SARA), including the rights of Shia citizens, without taking sides with any particular group. However, several regulations on religion that have been issued in Indonesia still do not adequately reflect the neutrality of the state. Consequently, these thoughts, which are based on sentiments about differences in belief and group membership, often influence and even encourage policy and decision-making concerning the public interest at large. As a result, such thoughts and practices that are hostile to diversity often lead to interactions that end in harmful actions against minority groups, as happened to Shia groups.[57]

The stance of the local government as the state representative also determines how religious groups interact with other different religious groups and organisations. In this case, the government's stance will affect the conditioning of persecution and intolerant behavior. State policies that promote and protect minority groups will contribute to the tolerance towards minority groups developed by other social and religious groups. Likewise, if the state takes the opposite stand on minorities, it will have the effect of increasing the intolerance of various social and religious groups towards them.[58]

The Role of Pressure Groups

To understand the role of non-state actors in the making of exclusionary policies against Shia groups, it is important to consider the anti-Shia movement. Although anti-Shia sentiment has developed since the New Order era—mainly due to the government's concern over the influence of the Iranian revolution, which then affected other sectors, including the MUI—the role of anti-Shia groups in the

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[56] Ismatu Ropi, *Religion and Regulation in Indonesia*, 1st ed. (Singapore: Springer Nature, 2017), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-2827-4.

[57] M.A.A Shah, "Antara Toleransi Dan Intoleransi: Dari Sub-Ordinasi Menuju Ko-Eksistensi Dalam Relasi Sunni-Syiah Kontemporer," *Jurnal Maarif* 10, no. 02 (2015): 130–323; Moh Sholehuddin, "Dilema Antara Keberagamaan Dan Keberwar-ganegaraan (Studi Fenomenologi Tentang Kesadaran Pengungsi Shi'ah Sampang Terhadap Hak Hak Sipil Tahun 2013-2020)" (Surabaya: UIN Sunan Ampel, 2020).

[58] Jeremy. Menchik, "Productive Intolerance: Godly Nationalism in Indonesia," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 56, 3 (2014): pp. 591–621.

formation of stances, campaigns, and even official policies against Shia groups, as in the rules on the Prohibition of Shia activities in South Sulawesi and Makassar City, is a later development.

The anti-Shia movement itself arose through a shift in national political currents, which opened up opportunities for groups to emerge in society.[59] The space for political expression becomes wider and is utilized to the fullest by groups that were restricted during the New Order. This movement spreads to the regions and has a structural impact on the dynamics of problems occurring at the local level. The emergence of anti-Shia groups as a pressure force is related to the opening of political opportunities in the wake of the Indonesian Reformation. This fact can be explained using the concept of political opportunity structure, as explained in Quintan's analysis of social movements. The emergence of social movements is often triggered by significant changes in the political structure of a country.[60]

These interest groups are formed under various names, but in general, they use religion-related names. In the case of South Sulawesi and Makassar, some of the interest groups are regional branches of national organisations, such as *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI) Makassar, which was founded in 2010. In its early years, the South Sulawesi FPI was chaired by Habib Mahmud Alhamid. He was succeeded by Habib M. Reza Alhamid, who was directly inaugurated by its general chairman, Habib M. Rizieq Shihab, at al-Markasal-Islami Mosque in the City of Makassar. The current chairman of South Sulawesi FPI is Habib Muhsin al-Habsyi. And the chairman of Makassar City FPI, since its founding, is Ustadz Agus Salim.[61]

There is *Aliansi Nasional Anti Syiah* (ANAS), which was declared in Bandung and then found its branches in various regions, including Makassar.[62] Together with other groups, ANAS formed a tactical

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[59] Syarif et.all, "Anti Shi'ism in Indonesia: Genealogy, Development, and Methods."

[60] Quintan Wiktorowicz, *Islamic Activism. A Social Movement Theory* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004).

[61] "Interview with Ustad AS" (Makassar, June 30, 2021).

[62] On April 20 2014 the Anti-Shia National Alliance (ANNAS) was founded, which was declared at the Al-Fajr Mosque in Bandung, West Java, with Athian Ali as head. Among those giving supporting speeches were Hamid Baidlowi (NU), Maman Abdurrahman (Persis), Muhammad Al-Khaththath (Forum Umat Islam, FUI), Cholil Ridwan (MUI) and Lalilurrahman (BASSRA). See; IPAC, "The Anti-Shi'a Movement Indonesia."

group to exclude Shia in Makassar under the name of Forum Ummat Islam Bersatu (FUIB). This tactical group consists of, among others, FPI, *Laskar Pemburu Aliran Sesat* (LPAS), *Wahda Islamiyah*, Hidayatullah, *Ikatan Dakwah Indonesia* (IKADI), ANNAS of South Sulawesi, *Garda Pembela Umat dan Bangsa* (Garuda), *Fokus Islam BTP*, *Sahabat Muslim*, *Forum Arimatea*, *and Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam* (LPPI) of the City of Makassar.[63]

Efforts to discredit Shia groups have been going on since the release of the rules in South Sulawesi and Makassar City. These efforts were done in several ways, including the distribution of stickers and banners in public spaces. Some of the banners bear the following: "*tolak Syiah tolak komunis, PKI mengancam NKRI, menurut fatwa MUI pusat Syiah bukan Islam*"(Reject Shia, Reject the Communists; PKI threatens the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia; according to the central MUI fatwa, Shia is not Islam). From the campaign in public spaces through pamphlets, the efforts escalated to the disbandment of Shia events, including the one that took place at the Clarion Hotel, Makassar. About 200 people, who took part in the Ashura Day celebration organized by IJABI in one of the ballrooms at the Clarion Hotel, were forcibly sent home by security forces under pressure from anti-Shia groups. Finally, the celebration was officially stopped by the Tamalate Sub-District Police and Makassar City Police under the pretext of not having permission to hold a gathering. It was also claimed that the celebration was held without informing the hotel.[64]

In 2012, there was also an attack by about a hundred members of the South Sulawesi FPI against Shia at the Graha Pena building, at Urip Sumoharjo Street, Makassar, on Friday (November 23, 2012), as they tried to disband the Ashura ceremony held by a Shia group. The ceremony was organised by IJABI to commemorate the death of the Prophet Muhammad's grandson, Imam Husein bin Ali, who died in Karbala on the 10th of Muharram in the first century of the Hijri year.[65]

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[63] "Interview with Ustad AB, Member of ANAS" (Makassar, July 1, 2021).

[64] Salviah Eka Padmasari, "Banyak Spanduk Anti Syiah Di Makassar," 2017, https://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/usai-pembubaran-hari-asyura-banyak-spanduk-anti-syiah-di-makassar.html.

[65] "FPI Sulsel Demo Peringatan Asyura Kelompok Syiah Di Makassar," 2012, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-2100037/fpi-sulsel-demo-peringatan-asyura-kelompok-syiah-di-makassar?utm_source=copy_url&utm_campaign=detikcomsocmed&utm_medium=btn&utm_content=news.

Other anti-Shia groups are *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI) and Wahdah Islamiyah. Both rallied at the campus of *Universitas Muslim Indonesia* (UMI) Makassar rejecting the international seminar on "Unity of the Islamic World" held by UMI Makassar with the Iranian Embassy in Indonesia.[66] Furthermore, anti-Shia action was taken by South Sulawesi ANNAS in 2020 by distributing a copy of the rule to all South Sulawesi people. According to the Chairman of South Sulawesi ANNAS, Ustadz Farid Maruf Nur, the rule was also sent specifically to the Regional Leadership Communication Forum (Forkopimda) which consisted of the Governor of South Sulawesi, the head of the regional police officer, the head of the regional military officer, the head of the district police officer at Makassar and Gowa.[67]

To ensure the consistency of the local government and other stakeholders regarding the prohibition of Shia activities, these anti-Shia groups actively establish close contact and communication with the authorities to remind them of what they call the dangers of Shia and the potential for horizontal conflict in the community if it is allowed to propagate freely (interview with Z, the leader of Brigade Muslim). These contacts and communications are more intensive every time Ashura is approaching. In addition, anti-Shia groups use individuals occupying strategic posts in public agencies and considered to share their religious vision and understanding to serve as internal mouthpieces to spread awareness about the dangers and heresies of the Shia. Not only among government officials, this group also actively spreads awareness of Shia heresy among the general public, either through preaching in mosques, sermons, or various social media platforms.[68]

Anti-Shia groups took advantage of the momentum of the Ashura celebration to exclude Shia groups. Ashura celebrations, especially those held in the city of Makassar, seem to be the focus of anti-Shia groups in limiting the movement of Shia communities in South Sulawesi. This action is held regularly every year before the Ashura celebration, which is on every 10th of Muharram in the Hijri year. Various groups are united under anti-Shia sentiment despite their

[66] Saif. Al Battar, "Strategi Politis Dakwah Syiah," 2013, https://www.arrahmah.id/strategi-politis-dakwah-syiah/.

[67] "Interview with FMN, Leader of ANNAS South Sulawesi" (Makassar, June 23, 2021).

[68] "Interview with MAP, Member of IJABI South Sulawesi" (Makassar, July 2, 2021).

differences and frictions on other socio-religious issues. Such unification happened, for example, in 2020 when a number of Islamic organisations joined under the auspices of South Sulawesi FUIB and declared their rejection of the Ashura celebration.[69]

Conclusion

Exclusion actions against Shia are based on reasons or legality resulting from the aforementioned policies. "Beware and Anticipate Shias" listed in the Circular Letter is a slogan that has been used by the public to isolate Shia adherents. In the findings of this study, some people who are identified as followers of Shia do not have the same access to freedom of religion as followers of other religious organisations to carry out religious activities. Shiite groups cannot access public spaces and participate in Ashura religious celebrations in mosques, that are open to the general public.

The policy in the form of the rule on guarding against the propagation of Shia has been used as a tool to legitimize other forms of exclusion, from stigmatization and discrimination to social exclusion. An important finding in this study shows that there is policy, as a political product, that is categorized as an act of exclusion. The political product is the rule on guarding and anticipating the propagation of Shia. The regulation was produced in the dynamics of the existing political system.

The exclusion is, therefore, carried out through a policy that cannot be separated from the existing political system as David Easton mentioned in his theory.[70] Shia groups refused to use the grand mosque to hold religious activities, including the Ashura celebration. In this context, their exclusion from public space is based on their religious identity. The public prohibition against Shia is legitimized by the regulation. In this sense, Shia has experienced political exclusion, either exclusion from religion or social exclusion. []

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[69] Anik Farida, "Respon Organisasi Massa Islam Terhadap Syiah Di Bandung Jawa Barat," *Penamas* 27, 02 (2017): pp. 159–76.

[70] David Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1965).

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